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PREFACE

This thesis concerns the reception of the Augustinian teaching on
grace in the fifth century, specifically the teachings on the absolute gratuity of
grace, predestination and the universal salvific will of God. The purpose of
this study is to analyze the contribution of Prosper of Aquitaine as an
interpreter of the Augustinian position, in the light of the late 20th century reevaluation of Semipelagianism.
After an examination of the historical and theological issues and the
proximate circumstances that gave rise to the controversy, we proceed to
examine the structure and content of all the relevant works on grace of
Prosper. In the third chapter of the thesis I examine the method of Prosper
more closely, his use of Sacred Scripture, his arguments and his
interpretation of the more controversial points of St. Augustine's exposition on
grace.

I offer some conclusions about the reception of the Augustinian

position, Prospers role in this reception and possible developments in
Prosper's own position.
Aside from scholarly debates, the issues mentioned above retain their
vitality in other ways.

For instance, the issue of predestination is of

unquestionable importance in the ecumenical field. The issue of the divine
salvific will has very important implications in missiology and our relations with
non-Christian religions. There are, of course, many other historical aspects
which add importance to the subject matter of this study but which I will not
address.
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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Around the year 412, St. Augustine wrote the first of his numerous
works related to the Pelagian controversy.

In fact, this often bitter polemic

occupied the celebrated bishop of Hippo right up until the time of his death in
430. Throughout this controversy, the main object of Augustine's criticism
was a religious anthropology which assumed the potential of human nature to
realize itself through the human free will.

This was the Pelagian outlook

which conceived divine grace as analogous to human nature.

One of the

main consequences of the Pelagian controversy was the growing tendency to
view divine grace as a rival to the human free will. From these questions on
the relationship between human free will and divine grace a more subtle
controversy emerged. The result was what history much closer to our own
time has called "Semipelagianism". In this chapter, I propose to reexamine
the history and the theological issues involved, concentrating on the first
stages of the controversy.
As early as 397, at the beginning of his episcopacy, Augustine already
had changed his mind on a very fundamental point.

Previously he had

believed that humans were able by the power of their own free will to take the
first steps towards faith and salvation. In other words, Augustine had thought
that the "first grace" (the beginning of faith) could be somehow merited. Only
his deep reflection on Sacred Scripture led him to be convinced of his error.1
1. E.g., 1 Cor 4, 7; Tit 3, 5; Rom 9, 15. 20; John 15, 5. It is interesting to note that
Augustine's former opinions on the beginning of faith (initium fidei) were used against him by
his adversaries in this controversy. Referring to this ironic turn of events Augustine writes:

1

Towards the end of 418 or the beginning of 419, Augustine wrote a
letter to the Roman priest Sixtus (who later on would occupy the See of Peter
as Sixtus Ill). The contents of this long letter are strongly anti-Pelagian and
some of its formulas -- which emphasized the absolute gratuitousness of all
divine gifts and strongly denied any human merit before the reception of this
divine grace -- could be easily misunderstood. And so it happened. The first
significant disagreement with the Augustinian teachings seems to have
developed about eight years later in a monastery of Hadrumetum (present
day Sousse, Tunisia).

In a sense, it should not surprise anyone that the

controversy would have emerged precisely in a monastery.

It seemed

inevitable that, in some cenobium, some monks would find the subtle
Augustinian teachings irreconcilable with their own ideas on the ascetic life.
We can gather from a letter written to Augustine by Valentinus, the
abbot of this monastery of Hadrumetum, that a young monk by the name of
Florus had made a trip which took him through his former hometown of Uzala.
Evodius, an old friend of Augustine, was at the time bishop of that city. In a
monastery there Florus found the letter to Sixtus which apparently he copied.
While he continued his trip to Carthage, Florus sent the copy of the letter to
his brother monks in Hadrumetum by way of his traveling companion Felix.2
Upon his return, Florus found among some of the monks confusion and
a strong reaction developing towards some teachings expressed in this letter.
After the abbot Valentinus was made aware of the situation, it was decided
" .. .in qua sententia istos fratres nostros esse nunc video; quia non sicut legere libros meos,
ita etiam in eis cu rave runt proficere mecum." De praedestinatione sanctorum 4, 8.
2. All the historical and biographical data given here is taken from the letter of Valentinus to
Augustine, Epistola 216, 2 (CSEL 57, 397). The phrase "imperitis fratribus", which alludes to
those "less prepared" monks who found Augustine's letter to Sixtus hard to accept, can be
found also in section 2 of this letter.
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that Evodius should be consulted and asked to clarify the Augustinian
teachings which seemed to negate human free will, the significance of human
actions and even the truth of divine judgment. At the very least, it seemed to
some of the monks that the Augustinian teachings rendered their ascetic way
of life superfluous.

But the efforts of the bishop of Uzala were for some

reason or another unsatisfactory. Finally, the Hadrumetan abbot Valentinus
permitted two of the monks, Cresconius and Felix, to travel to Hippo to verify
the Augustinian authorship of the offending letter and that being the case, to
request from Augustine himself some answers to the objections.3
Augustine received the young monks and charitably tried to provide for
them the necessary explanations which they sought in trying to reconcile his
teachings on divine grace and human free will.4 Besides the oral instructions,
Augustine subsequently wrote two letters to Valentinus and his monks
(Epistola 214 and 215 in Augustine's corpus of letters). In the first letter, by
using an analogy with the christological titles of Savior and Judge, he
explained how both divine grace and human free will could be reconciled.
From the second letter we learn how the two inquiring monks were joined by a
3. See Epistola 214 of Augustine, ad Valentinum 1 (Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos (BAC),
Obras de San Agustin, volume 11, pp. 1002-8).
4. The following is a well known Augustinian expression found in the letter to Sixtus which
exemplifies the monks' main objection: "Quod est ergo meritum hominis ante gratiam, quo
merito percipiat gratiam, cum omne bonum meritum nostrum non in nobis faciat nisi gratia; et
cum Deus coronat merita nostra, nihil aliud coronet quam munera sua?" (Epistola 194, 19).
In this letter we also find a reference to the phrase initium fidei perhaps for the first
time in the works of Augustine. It is used in his commentary to a verse of the biblical Song of
Songs. Augustine follows a version of the Septuagint which translated into Latin renders the
I

verse in question as "veni de Libano, sponsa mea, veni de Libano, venies et pertransies ab
initio fidei." (Song 4, 8). He interprets the verse as referring to Christ and his spouse the
Church. It might be of exegetical interest also to note that the Hebrew version of the text
renders the last part of the verse as "depart from the peak of Amana" while the Septuagint
reads "rut0 <XPXTl~ mme~."
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third one also named Felix. Though anxious to return to their monastery, they
were convinced by Augustine to stay a while longer, and as Easter time was
near, the monks actually stayed to celebrate the Holy Week with Augustine.
In the meantime they were further instructed on the pitfalls of the Pelagian
teachings. Augustine also provided them with many of the Church documents
by which these teachings had been anathematized.5 He even took the time
to write a new book, De gratia et libero arbitrio, addressed to the abbot
Valentinus and the rest of the Hadrumetan community.
The monks who consulted Augustine must have been somewhat
overwhelmed by the treatment they received from the renowned bishop of
Hippo and after Easter they returned to Hadrumetum temporarily satisfied.
But new difficulties and new distorted applications of the Augustinian
teachings arose among them. Some reasoned as follows: If our ability to do
good works depends upon a gift, how can we be admonished or reproved for
not accomplishing

these

good

works

(i.e.

for

lacking

the

gift of

perseverance)?6 Thus the monks came to the false conclusion that fraternal
correction was useless.

On hearing of this type of reasoning and still

5. Epistola 215 of Augustine, ad Valentinum 2 (BAC volume 11, p. 1010): "Portant autem
secum et alia, quae vobis dirigenda esse credidimus, quibus cognoscatis quemadmodum
catholica Ecclesia, in Dei misericordia, Pelagianae haeresis venena repulerit. Quod enim
scriptum est ad papam lnnocentium romanae urbis episcopum, de concilio provinciae
Carthaginensis et de concilio Numidiae, et aliquanto diligentius an quinque episcopis, et quae
ipse ad tria ista rescripsit; item quod papae Zosimo de Africano concilio scriptum est,
eiusque rescriptum ad universos totius orbis episcopos missum; et quod posteriori concilio
plenario totius Africae contra ipsum errorem breviter constituimus; et supra memoratum
librum meum, quern modo ad vos scripsi: haec omnia et in praesenti legimus cum ipsis, et
per eos misimus vobis."
6. This is essentially the same question which the Pelagians posed: If the choice to good or
evil depends on a cause extrinsic to the human will, can we still be held responsible for our
choice?
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attempting to reconcile the basic inability of human nature to do "good" works
(meaning "salvific" works) with the role of human accountability for its own evil
actions, Augustine wrote another book (c. 426-427) appropriately entitled De
correptione et gratia and sent it to the Hadrumetan monks via the monk

Florus, who had travelled to Hippo with a letter from Valentius explaining to
Augustine the course of the disturbance (letter no. 216).
But not only from Hadrumetum, also from other parts of North Africa
one could hear disturbed and dissenting voices rising against the Augustinian
teachings on grace.

For example, at about the same time that this was

happening in Hadrumetum, a certain Vitalius wrote to Augustine from
Carthage objecting to his teachings of the divine action in the initium fidei.
Augustine's long reply has been preserved in his Epistola 217 ad Vita/em.
This letter provides an excellent summary of the Augustinian positions which
were to become key issues in the "semipelagian" controversy. These include,
after an initial affirmation of original sin, 1) the gratuity and necessity of divine
grace for all, even infants, and 2) a distribution of divine grace which in
particular rejects the teaching that the death of non-baptized infants is a
punishment for the sins which God foresaw they would have committed had
they lived to a more mature age.
Another significant aspect of the Augustinian teachings appear in this
letter. This aspect -- which could be called "pastoral" -- is often overlooked
but it is important to realize that for Augustine (as well as for his disciple
Prosper as we shall see) the ultimate confirmation as to the truth of a
theological position was found in the practice of the Church. So for instance,
how does one know that faith is an absolutely gratuitous gift from God?
Because the Church, always and everywhere, has prayed to obtain faith for
unbelievers.

And how does one know that perseverance is an equally

5

absolutely gratuitous gift from God? Because similarly the Church prays in
thanksgiving for the conversion and the salvation of sinners.
Even though these events from Hadrumetum and Carthage gave
evidence of the resistance to the Augustinian teachings on grace, it was in
Southern Gaul, especially at Marseille and Lerins (hence the term Massilian),
that the real opposition arose. It was in fifth century Gaul where the reception
of "Augustinianism" was to be tested most profoundly.
Shortly after the first decade of the fifth century the island monastery of
Lerins (off the coast of modern day Cannes) and the monastery of St. Victor
in Marseille were founded, the former by Honoratus, a young man of noble
birth, later bishop of Aries? and the latter by John Cassian, one of the more
influential figures in Western monasticism and a key figure in this controversy.
We do not have many biographical details on Cassian. Neither the date of his
birth nor of his death is known with certainty (c. 360 - c. 435). His birthplace
is equally unknown although Gennadius of Marseille indicates Scythia minor
as most probable.a

We do not know exactly when he became a monk

although it must have been shortly after his adolescence when he went with
his close friend Germanus to seek admission among the cenobites of
Palestine in Bethlehem. We also know that he travelled to Egypt where he
spent a considerable amount of time among the desert ascetics.9

He left

7. The biographical details can be found in the Sermo de vita S. Honorati by Hilarius of Aries
(PL 50, 1249-72).
8. Gennadius was a late fifth century Gallic historian author of the De viris inlutribus.
Cassian's biographical data can be found in section 62 (61). The reference is taken from
Patrology, volume 4, edited by Angelo di Berardino and introduced by John Quasten
(Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1986).
9. This is deduced from Cassian's Collationes X through XX where Cassian writes as if
several of these abbots were the actual teachers.
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Palestine and Egypt permanently around 399 and travelled to the East. In
Constantinople he was ordained a deacon by John Chrysostom in the first
years of the fifth century.10 Around 405, when John Chrysostom was for a
second time in exile, Cassian went to Rome where eventually he was
ordained to the priesthood before finally coming to Gaul and establishing the
monastery of St. Victor at Marseille between 415 and 417.
A sign of the influence and reputation which he enjoyed in later years
(even beyond Gaul itself) is the fact that it was Cassian who towards the end
of 429 was asked by the Roman deacon (later pope) Leo to respond to the
challenge of Nestorius' denial of the Theotokos. The abbot of St. Victor was
well prepared for this task linguistically as well as culturally having lived for so
long in the East. Using the information taken from the first letters (written in
Greek) of Nestorius to pope Celestine I and from certain extracts of Nestorius'
own sermons, Cassian eventually wrote De incarnatione Christi contra
Nestorium.

Significantly, in this book Cassian argued that the ideas of

Nestorius, however different from the views of Pelagius, were logically
equivalent to Pelagianism.
It was in these monasteries of Gaul under Cassian's leadership that
the main opposition to the Augustinian teachings on grace arose. Between
427 and 429, the situation was such that two ardent followers of Augustine
who lived in Gaul alerted him by letters to the controversy that his doctrines
were generating in Marseille and its surroundings.

These two men were

Hilarius and Tiro Prosper of Aquitaine. Not much is known about either of the
10. Cassian's De incarnatione 7, 31, 1 (CSEL, 17, 389): "Unde ego quoque ipse, humilis
atque obscurus nomine sicut merito, licet mihi inter eximios Constantinopolitanae urbis
antistites locum magistri usurpare non possim, studium tamen discipuli affectumque
praesumo, adoptatus enim a beatisimae memoriae Johanne episcopo in ministerium sacrum
atque oblatus deo, ... "
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two.11

Hilarius, not to be confused with the bishop of Aries, was a layman

who was personally acquainted with Augustine probably having lived and
studied with him in Africa. It is known that he wrote other letters to Augustine
from Gaul although only one has survived (Epistola 226 in Augustine's corpus
of letters). Prosper never met Augustine, as he himself writes in the preface
of his only surviving letter to the bishop of Hippo. He was probably also a
layman who was closely associated with some of the monasteries of the
region, a sort of lay monk which was not uncommon at the time.12
Augustine replied to these two letters with a bipartite work;

the De

Praedestinatione Sanctorum and the De dono perseverantiae. These books

emphasized once again the teachings that the grace of God is not given
according to our merits and that predestination and perseverance are pure
gifts from God who calls us in order to believe rather than because we
believe.

Augustine also reiterates that if we say that faith comes from

ourselves and that as a reward to our willingness we receive other gifts from
God, we simply come to the Pelagian position that grace is given according to
our merits. However, there were some questions (e.g., why one is elected
and another not?) which Augustine admits can be answered only by affirming
the inscrutability of God's judgment. Nevertheless, Augustine does not fail to
show the pastoral significance of this mystery.

The situation invites all

Christians to a deeper sense of prayer and calls them to a humble trust in
God which is crucial in avoiding the extremes of presumption and despair in

11. Once again, the meager biographical data on Prosper of Aquitaine originates from
Gennadius of Marseille, De viris inlustribus 85 (84).
12. Not until the time of St. Benedict were monks usually members of the clergy.
Prosper's time, the monastic rank was quite distinct from the clerical state.
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In

the road to salvation. As for the rest, there is no apology or mitigation in
Augustine's words and the controversy continued.
While awaiting Augustine's reply to his letter, Prosper wrote a long
poem, the Carmen de ingratis, which dealt with Pelagianism, the ensuing
Massilian controversy and the connections between the two. The poem is a
passionate piece of poetry but it did no more than summarize the Augustinian
position and expressed it in a different literary genre. Augustine died shortly
after in August of 430 and another period in the dispute emerged. Prosper
threw himself completely into the debate and became Augustine's first
expositor and defender against the Massilians. His first work after 430 was
probably his answers to several excerpts taken out of context by two Genoan
priests from the aforementioned Augustinian bipartite reply to the letters of
Prosper and Hilarius. Two other pamphlets followed in close succession 13,
each answering distortions of the Augustinian doctrines which apparently
were circulating in the vicinity of Marseille and Lerins.
The controversy was developing in such a way that Prosper and his
associate Hilarius sought help from the Apostolic See in settling the
dispute.14 Prosper probably felt confident in expecting a favorable verdict
from the bishop of Rome since Celestine (pope from 422 until 432) had
battled the Pelagians vigorously and as Prosper asserted, the Massilians in
general had a theological kinship to the Pelagians.

But the leader of the

Massilian monks was John Cassian (and recall that about two years before he
had played a very important role in the Nestorian affair). We can imagine that
13. These two pamphlets are: 1) the answers to the objections of the Gauls and 2) the
answers to the Vincentian articles.
14. The chronology of this trip and the three works (answers to the excerpts of the Genoese,
answers to the Gauls, answers to the Vincentian articles) is uncertain.
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this fact was not conducive at all for Celestine to be fully convinced of the
alleged tendencies of Cassian towards Pelagian ideas.

Furthermore,

Celestine did not seem to have undertaken a serious look at all the doctrinal
questions involved in the Massilian controversy. Nevertheless, Prosper's trip
to Rome was the occasion of a letter of Celestine to the bishops of Gaul.15
Even though Celestine treats the issues under debate generically, the
competency, doctrinal soundness, and the person of Augustine were
eulogized by Celestine when he writes:
" Augustine, a man whose life and even merits have remained in
holy memory, was always in communion with us; never did a sinister
suspicion fall upon him: So great was his knowledge as we can recall
that those before me always held him among the best teachers. Thus
everyone held him in high esteem as someone who reflected love and
honor on all."16
The rest of the letter is disciplinary in tone. It points to the bishops'
connivance in the matter and it instructs them to put a stop to the discord and
the accusations that "certain presbyters" levelled upon "teachers whose
disciples they had not been."17 All of this is said in reference to Augustine
15. Epistola 21, 8. Coelestini papae ad episcopos Galliarum (PL 50, 528-530).
16. Ibid., PL 50, 530 A: "Augustinum sanctae recordationis virum pro vita sua atque meritis
in nostra communione semper habuimus, nee umquam hunc sinistrae suspicionis saltem
rumor aspersit: quern tantae scientiae olim fuisse meminimus, ut inter magistros optimos
etiam ante a meis semper decessoribus haberetur. Bene ergo de eo omnes in communi
senserunt, utpote qui ubique cunctis et amori fuerit et honori."
17. Ibid.: " ... Filii nostri praesentes, Prosper et Hilarius, quorum circa Deum nostrum
sollicituod laudandaest, tantum nescio quibus presbyteris illic licere qui dissensioni
ecclesiarum studeant, sunt apud nos prosecuti ut indisciplinatas quaestiones vocantes in
medium pertinaciter eos dicant praedicare adversantes veritati. Se vestrae dilectioni iustius
imputamus, quando illi supra vos habent copiam disputandi. Legimus supra magistrum non
esse discipulum, hoc est, non sibi debere quern quam in injuriam doctorum vindicare
doctrinam. Nam et hos ipsos a Deo nostro positos novimus ad docendum; cum sit, dicente
Apostolo eis tertius locus intra Ecclesiam deputandus. Quid illic spei est, ubi, magistri
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and the Massilians. So it is perhaps noteworthy how the author of the famous
commonitorium uses the contents of Celestine's letter without ever
mentioning the name of Augustine even in places where it would have been
natural to do so.18
Back in Gaul, Prosper apparently came across a copy of Cassian's XIII
Conference. As a final attempt to refute the Massilians he wrote the De gratia
Dei et libero arbitrio liber contra Collatorem.
successful in several ways as we shall see.

The attempt was not too
Nevertheless, with Cassian's

death (c. 435) the controversy seems to have died down. Prosper himself
settled permanently in Rome where he was of service to pope Leo I. During
this truce several other important works -- indirectly associated with the
controversy -- were written.

Among these are, 1) the Capitula or

tacentibus, ii loquuntur qui, si ita est, eorum discipuli non tuerunf? .. .Desinat, si ita res sunt,
incessere novitas vetustatem."
18. For example, the names of Ambrose (in chapter 5), Cyprian (ch. 6), Hilary of Poitiers (ch.
18) and popes Sixtus and Celestine (ch. 32) are all praised. Moreover, since a good part of
the Commonitorium deals with the "antiquity and universality of the Catholic faith against the
novelties of all heresies," the following names are displayed as authorities: Athanasius, Basil,
Cyril, Cyprian, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa and many other authors quoted at
Ephesus (ch. 30 and 31). But the name of Augustine is conspicuously absent from this litany
of saints, even when the Donatist heresy is discussed.
The "Pellegrinus", pseudonym of the author of the Commonitorium, has been usually
thought to be Vincent of Lerins (also thought to be the author of an scurrilous pamphlet
against Augustine's teachings on grace which we will discuss in chapter 2 of this thesis). But
it is interesting to note that after the discovery of the Excerpta (discovered and attributed to
Vincent by Jose Madoz, S.J. in a published work of 1940) the thesis of the "antiAugustinianism" of Vincent of Lerins had to be considerably modified, for not only does the
name of Augustine appear in the Excerpta but it is given a place of honor as model of the
Fathers. The answer given by Madoz is not very satisfying in my opinion. He compromises
by saying that the compliments of the Excerpta are paid to the Doctor of the Trinity and the
Incarnation while the veiled antipathy of the Commonitorium is directed towards the Doctor of
grace and predestination. Cf. J. Madoz, Excerpta Vincentii Lirinensis, Estudios Onienses,
serie 1, vol. 1 (Madrid, 1940). See also his work, El concepto de la Tradici6n en S. Vicente
de Lerins, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, vol. 5 (Roma, 1933).
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Praeteritorum Sedis Apostolicae Episcoporum Auctoritates de gratia Dei, 2)
the Uber sententiarum ex operibus S. Augustini delibatarum, and 3) the De

vocatione omnium gentium.
The first of these three works is usually attached to Celestine's Epistola

21 to the Gallic episcopacy. Although the Prosperian authorship of this work
is not beyond question, it is clearly not part of Celestine's original letter. This
document is of great doctrinal significance. It was of important use not only in
the fifth and sixth centuries, but also in the predestinarian controversies of
later centuries.19 The second work mentioned above is clearly of Prosperi an
authorship.

It consists of 392 Augustinian sayings, of course all out of the

original context. But through them Augustinian thought was made known to
subsequent ages.20 The synod of Orange (529) used this work in many of its
canons which were in turn used by the council of Trent in its decrees on
justification and grace. Besides its importance in conciliar history, this work
has a special literary importance. Together with Vincent's Excerpta, it seems
to be a prototype of the florigelium genre so popular in the middle ages.
During this final period of Prosper's life at Rome, the book De

vocatione omnium gentium appeared. This treatise, among the first to deal
19. In this document we find what could be considered simply a prudent reservation placed
on the profound and difficult questions of the controversy. For example, the last section (no.
10) states: "Profundiores vero difficilioresque partes incurrentium quaestionum, quas latius
pertractarunt, qui haeriticis restiterunt, sicut non audemus contemnere, ita non necesse
habemus adstruere, quia ad confitendum gratiam Dei, cuius operi ac dignationi nihil penitus
subtrahendum est, satis sufficere credimus, quidquid secundum praedictas regulas
Apostolicae Sedis nos scripta docuerunt: ut prorsus non opinemur catholicum, quod
apparuerit praefixis sententiis esse contrarium." In my opinion, too much is made of the fact
that Augustine's name does not appear in the Capitula (the question is, why should it
appear?).
20. We might also add that Augustinian thought has been often distorted by the careless use
of these out-of-context statements.
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with the salvation of non-Christians, has been attributed also to Prosper with
some degree of probability by modern scholarship. History does not hear
----from Prosper again after 455. This is the year in which his Chronica, a history
of the world which he had been working on, ends abruptly.21
Even before Prospers death the first period of the controversy could
be said to have ended. There were several years of peace and tranquility
between the followers of Augustine and the disciples of the Massilian position.
But a second, more complicated phase errupted following certain writings of
Faustus, abbot of the monastery at Lerins since 433 and later bishop of Riez.
Around 473, a synod at Aries had dealt with the predestinarian
doctrines of the Gallic priest Lucidus. Faustus was appointed to summarize
the points of doctrine and he eventually wrote his well known De gratia et
libero arbitrio. This work apparently found no opposition in Gaul even though

it clearly went beyond Cassian's own teachings as found in his XIII
Conference.

However, this is hardly surprising since many of the Gallic

bishops favored, to say the least, the Massilian system over the Augustinian
teachings. It is a historical fact that the monastery of Lerins was a breeding
ground of prospective Gallic bishops during that era.
However, by the beginning of the sixth century, Faustus' work -- which
clearly attributed to the human will the initiative towards salvation -- found
strong opposition from a group of "Scythian monks" who further complicated
matters with a christological controversy of their own. They asked the exiled
African bishop Possesor to rule on the orthodoxy of Faustus who by this time
had been long dead (c. 493). Possesor himself seems to have consulted the
21. See the article of Adalbert Hamman in Patrology, vol. IV, edited by Angelo di Berardino
and introduced by J. Quasten, pp. 551-58, for these and other details on the works of
Prosper.
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matter with Hormisdas, the bishop of Rome.

Hormisdas, in a letter dated

around 520, did not censure the writings of Faustus but neither did he regard
them as "in auctoriate patrum".22 The pope refers to the "various books of
St. Augustine" and to the Capitula allegedly of Prosperian origins but long
since attached to the letter of Celestine to the Gallic episcopacy.23
The Scythian monks also proposed the matter of the orthodoxy of
Faustus to some exiled African bishops in Sardinia. Fulgentius of Ruspe, also
known for his christological writings, responded in the name of the bishops
opposing the "semipelagian" position of Faustus.

But despite all efforts it

seems that the whole muddled affair might have gone on indefinitely had it not
been for Caesarius of Aries. This bishop had been a monk at Lerins. Of
course, his training there had made him very familiar with the Massilian
teachings and in particular with the writings of Cassian and Faustus. But he
had also studied at length the writings of Augustine. Caesarius eventually
presided over the synod of Orange in 529 which won approval for many of the
Augustinian teachings.
This synod (also known as the Second Council of Orange) was virtually
ignored during the middle ages. It was attended by only a handful of Gallic
bishops so it was more of a synod than a council.

But its doctrinal

significance is not questioned in the Church, especially after the use that

22.

Epistola 70, Ad Possessorem episcopum (PL 63, 492 B): "Neque illum recipi, neque

quemquam, quos in auctoritate Patrum non recipit examen catholicae fidei, aut ecclesiasticae
disciplinae ambiguitatem posse gignere, aut religiosis praejudicium comparare."
23. PL 63, 493 A: "De arbitrio tamen libero, et gratia Dei, quod romana (hoc est catholica)
sequatur et asseveret Ecclesia, licet in variis libris beati Augustini, et maxime ad Hilarium et
Prosperum, possit cognosci, tamen in scriniis ecclesiasticis expressa capitula continentur,
quae sibi desunt, et necessaria creditis, destinabimus, quanquam qui diligenter apostoli dicta
considerat, quid sequi debeat evidenter cognoscat."
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Trent made of its canons.

The acts of the synod of Orange consist of a

preface and a final profession of faith together with 25 canons, all of which are
borrowed more or less literally from Augustine's writings. In the majority of
the cases they are verbally identical with one of Prospers Sententiae.24 For
example, canon 5 appears to be a compendium of the main theses in the De

praedestinatione sanctorum and vindicates Prosper's position on the initium
tidei. Canon 6 states that it is not correct to say that divine grace is imparted
to us when we, by our own strength, ask, seek and knock. Rather it is divine
grace that works in us so that we believe, ask, etc. The text of this canon has
clear analogues in the De dono perseverantiae and Prospers Contra

Collatorem.

Canon 8 contradicts the teaching of Cassian in his XIII

Conference by affirming that it is not correct to say that some attain divine
grace by the mercy of God while others do it by their own free will however
weakened by Adam's sin.
Despite some historical difficulties connected with the origin of the
conciliar text itself, the result remains the same; this synod of Orange in 529
provided a mortal blow to the Massilian positions and at the same time the
Augustinian teachings -- clarified and with reservations placed on the subtle
issues related to predestination -- were sanctioned by the Church.25
24. The first eight canons are in the form of decrees and the last seventeen are in the form of
sentences. A complete analysis can be found in Charles Hefele, History of the Councils of
the Church, vol. 4 (AD 451 to AD 680), AMS Press reprint from 1895 edition, pp. 152-67. Cf.
also J. Patout Burns, S.J., Theological Anthropology, chapter 7, in the series Sources of Early

Christian Thought, edited by W. Rusch (Fortress Press, 1981 ). For the critical edition in
Latin, I have consulted the Corpus Christianorum (series latina) 148A, pp. 53 - 73.
25. It is true that the conciliar text itself shows some reservations. For instance, it makes no
explicit affirmation about predestination to salvation or to grace although it explicitly
condemns predestination to evil. Nevertheless, canon 20 reads: "A person can do nothing
good without God. God does many things in a person which the person himself does not do,
but the person does no good things which God does not provide that the person do." Also
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Since the writings of Augustine refuting Pelagianism contained the
teachings with which the Massilians disagreed, a theological setting of the
controversy should include at least a brief look at Pelagianism itself.
The underlying idea of the Pelagian system is not simply its essential
denial of the supernatural order.

It is true that the Pelagian view by its

"naturalism" has devastating consequences for many central Christian ideas
such as the fall, original sin, the necessity of baptism, the significance of
Christ, his redemptive sacrifice and the divinization of humanity taught by
Augustine but even more characteristic of the Greek Fathers. But at the heart
of the Pelagian outlook was a notion of the freedom of the human will which
proclaimed its absolute independence in relationship to God.

This notion

stands in sharp contrast against the idea of the fundamental insufficiency of
fallen humanity in the Augustinian system. Nothing differentiates Augustine
more from Pelagius than the recognition of the fact that to be free is not the
same as to have a free will. From the Augustinian perspective freedom is
ultimately experienced in the loss of freedom to sin.26 From the Pelagian
outlook free will meant nothing else that the possibility of doing good or doing
evil. Julian of Eclanum, an expositor of Pelagianism and Augustine's young
nemesis in the final phase of the Pelagian polemics, did not hesitate to speak

Canon 12 states: "God loves us as we will be by his own gift, not as we are by our merits."
These two canons along with the use of 1 Cor 4, 7 ["What have you that you have not
received?] in the final definition of faith of the synod seems to me to be tantamount to the
principle of predilection which is the key point in Augustine's definition of predestination.
26. De correptione et gratia 12, 33: "Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat, posse non peccare;
novissima erit multo maior, non posse peccare. Prima immortalitas erat posse non mori;
novissima erit multo maior, non posse mori. Prima erat perseverantiae potestas, bonum
posse non deserere; novissima erit felicitas perseverantiae, bonum non posse deserere."
(BAC, Obras de San Agustin, volume 6, p. 178).

16

of humanity's "emancipation from God" by the possession of its free will. And
Pelagius himself would assert that the will is not free if it needs the help of
God.27
It is important to remember that Pelagius was not a philosopher. He
was a rigorous ascetic, a moralist who directed souls for many years
especially among the well-to-do Christians.

The Pelagian anthropological

outlook sprang forth to a great extent as a protest against the laxity of many
wealthy Christians of that age.

We do not claim, of course, that this

phenomenon is unique in Christian history. In fact, at about the same period
in time, in the West we have the example of St. Jerome, whose indignation
was aroused by the extreme worldliness of the Christians among the Roman
aristocracy.

Some of his witty sarcasm and vehement denunciations have

been preserved for us in his unforgettable letters. Similarly in the East, we
have St. John Chrysostom who devoted so much of his energy and talents as
orator in attacking the laxity of his people that he became a "nuisance" to the
worldly Christians of his fold. But unlike Jerome and John, and despite his
experience in directing souls, Pelagius seems to have had an inadequate
understanding of human nature.
If we coupled these observations with the prevalent atmosphere of
decadence and syncretism of Christian and pagan ideas (especially from
Stoicism), then it helps us to put into perspective the dreadful rigorism which
characterized many of the Pelagian teachings. For example, Pelagius would

27. Julian's statement is quoted by Augustine in Op. Imp. contra Jul. 1, 78: "Libertas arbitrii,
qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in admittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccati possibilitate
consistit." Likewise Pelagius' assertion is taken from Augustine's De gestis Pelagii 18, 42:
"In decimo capitulo: 'Non est liberum arbitrium si Dei indiget auxilio, quonian in propria
voluntate habet unusquisque aut facere aliquid, aut non facere.'" (BAC, Obras de San
Agustin, volume 9, p. 744).
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condemn the rich simply for not renouncing their wealth.

In fact, in the

Pelagian outlook of morality all good acts became obligatory and anyone
guilty of the slightest offense was no longer a member of the Church.
Furthermore, one could be reprobated for all eternity for the offense, however
small. It is interesting to note that at the synod of Diospolis (December 415)
the bishops gathered demanded from Pelagius a retraction to one of his
assertions to the effect that on the day of judgment no mercy would be shown
to sinners.28
The Pelagian view of freedom of the human will and this rigorism was
to have a profound effect on the Pelagian notion of grace.
Pelagians applied the term "grace" to the gifts of creation.

First of all,
That is, they

applied it to natural qualities in human nature which are good because their
Creator is good. Grace was something that humanity enjoyed as part of its
nature so Pelagians could say that it was indeed by "grace" that we could
choose to be with or without sin. Secondly, Pelagians used the term "grace"
as enlightment of our natural capabilities. Thus for instance, they assigned an
extremely important place to the Law in the Old Testament and to the
teaching of Jesus whose role was essentially reduced to an example in what
one ought to do. In summary, the Pelagian conception of grace was in terms
of an initial forgiveness of sins by Christ, followed by an inspiration based on
the Law and the life of Christ inciting us to the practice of perfect justice.29
In a historical and theological setting of "Semipelagianism", I believe it
is important to consider the issues within a framework of "Christian

28.

Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo; life and controversies, Revised 1986 edition

(Canterbury Press Norwich), pp. 335-40.

29. Ibid., p. 363.
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spirituality".

This is important in view of the fact that it was the different

theologico-anthropological outlooks (and thus "spiritualities") which were at
the root of the controversy. This consideration seems all the more natural if
one recalls that the most able expositor among the "semipelagians" was John
Cassian, the famous author of the Collationes or conferences, who otherwise
has so many merits in the history of Christian spirituality.

Moreover, it is

almost trite to say that Augustine's own conversion experience influenced
much of his outlook. In other words, the Augustinian exposition of the issues
owes much to his own spirituality.
Basically, Cassian maintained that in the act of faith -- from which all
must begin for one cannot please God without faith -- there is a beginning, a
development and a consummation.

Moreover, in the beginning of faith

(initium fidei) there are three distinguishing factors; the adherence to faith, the

desire for salvation that emanates from faith and finally our invocation for
divine assistance. I do not think that either Augustine or Prosper would have
denied any of this. The difference was that in Cassian's spirituality all of the
three aforementioned factors were the result of the human free will while
Augustine's own conversion experience suggested to him that this could not
be the case. So it is clear that the "semipelagians" did not deny the action of
divine grace in humans. They simply limited its influence in the total process
towards union with God, giving priority (however small) to human initiative in
the beginning stage.
There

was

one

additional

difference

between

Cassian's

and

Augustine's spirituality. Augustine had written that "in between the beginning
of faith and the perfectioning of perseverance there are all those things by
which we live a righteous life, things which they (Cassian and the Massilians)
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also embrace as gifts from God through faith."30 In other words, Cassian's
ascetic outlook viewed final perseverance not as a gift (as Augustine did), but
as a reward for our willingness.

Within this framework I believe the real

issues are best understood.
Finally, a brief look at the origins of the term "Semipelagia!Jism" is in
order. This name commonly used in our time to denote the opinions of John
Cassian and the Massilians was coined probably in the late 16th century from
the dispute generated by two Spanish theologians, Luis de Molina (15351601) of the Society of Jesus and Domingo Banez (1528-1604) of the Order
of Preachers. This dispute led to the De auxiliis conferences (1590-1607)
which ended with no definite pronouncement from the Church but apparently
a new term in the history of doctrine was born. Nevertheless, only in the 17th
century did the usage of the term become more common.31

The term

"Semipelagian" is somewhat misleading when applied to people like John
Cassian.

It may give the idea that, while not adopting all the teachings of

Pelagius, he defended certain others. The term is not accurate also in the
sense of placing Cassian somewhere between the Pelagians -- who glorified
the primacy of human nature and free will at the expense of divine grace -and Augustine -- who wished to assert the absolute gratuity of divine grace
but without prejudice to the human free will.
30. De dono perseverantiae 21, 56: "Inter initium fidei et perfectionem perseverantiae media
illa sunt quibus recte vivimus, quae ipsi etiam donari nobis a Deo mediante fide consentium."
31. Cf. M. Jacquin, O.P., "A quelle date apparatt le term 'semipelagien'?" Revue des
Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques I (1907): 506-8.
Although in the middle ages there is no trace of the term "semipelagian", it is
noteworthy that St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa contra Gentiles (bk. 3) well defines the
Catholic teaching of the initium tidei, a denial of which is attributed to the Pelagians. And in
the Summa Theologica (I, 23.5) he clearly distinguishes between the doctrines of Pelagius
and some Pelagian teachings (which would be denoted in later centuries as "semipelagian").
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Since the opposition in Southern Gaul to the Augustinian doctrines was
not truly out of sympathy to Pelagius' point of view, some historians have
suggested the term "anti-Augustinianism" as an alternative. But the new term
is not helpful in eliminating the possible misunderstandings.

In fact, it just

"sweeps the dirt under the rug." One is left in need of defining what is meant
by "Augustinianism", a very tendentious term in itself. Therefore, we must
note certain points in favor of the standard terminology.
First of all, Pelagianism does deny fundamentally the absolute gratuity
and necessity of grace. Even critics of the term "semipelagian" admit that in
rejecting the Augustinian teachings on grace many less able than Cassian
approached the Pelagian doctrines.32 Therefore, historically speaking, there
is something to be said in favor of the accuracy of the term.
Second, although the term "semipelagian" is anachronistic and could
be misleading, the point is not whether or not Cassian and his followers
desired to subscribe to Pelagian ideas.

The point should be that their

opinions (on the initium fidei, for example) logically led to positions closely
attuned to Pelagian notions. It is true that the controversy could be called
"anti-Augustinian" for it was the result of an excessive reaction to certain
ideas of Augustine in conceiving the distribution of divine grace and the role of
the human free will in the divine salvific plan.

It is also true that the

geographical term "Massilian" is also historically accurate -- Prosper himself
used it.

But the term "semipelagian" is descriptive and thus, I maintain,

appropriate. After all, in analyzing the different types of conversions -- the
32. See for example the statements of 0. Chadwick in his monograph on John Cassian
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 127-28. On page 127 Chadwick categorically asserts
that the name semipelagian is "wrong." But on the following page he adds, "but in rejecting
the teaching of Augustine there were some among them who approach the Pelagian
doctrine."
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apostle Paul, Zacchaeus, Matthew, Cornelius, the good thief -- Cassian
concluded that sometimes grace is previous to human efforts but other times
it was obtained as a reward after asking, knocking and searching (cf. Mat 7,
7). Therefore, one could say Cassian placed himself in a "semi" position.
Many of Cassian's opinions are otherwise irreproachable especially when
given a charitable interpretation. But the same cannot be said of the thought
and expressions of his less nuanced followers.33 It is with this more general
group in mind that "Semipelagianism" is accurately said to be a remnant of
Pelagianism.34

33. Of course, the same could be said of Augustine's disciples, especially "expositors" of
later centuries. As G. Bonner has wittily written, "it may be admitted that Augustine has not
been altogether fortunate in his disciples. Any author who numbers Gottschalk, Calvin, and
Cornelius Jansen among his expositors is much to be pitied." op. cit., p. 312.
34. While distinct in appearance, logically they were very much related. Thus Prosper calls
them "Pelagianae pravitatis reliquiis" (Ad Aug., PL 51, 72 D).
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CHAPTER II
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE RELEVANT
PROSPERIAN WORKS

Prosper's theology of grace has to be deduced from a series of
controversial works composed in a particular situation and with a particular
purpose.

Our task is to decide what emphasis should be placed upon a

particular work in the course of the Massilian controversy or even upon
particular remarks in these works. In order to minimize the problems created
by focusing too narrowly on a work, I shall examine all the known Prosperian
works prior to 435. This task is facilitated by the fact that their number is
small (7 total) and all of them are relatively short documents.

But I shall

certainly consider several other Prosperian works dated after 435 related to
the subject matter at hand.1 Needless to say, I shall often refer to the writings
of Augustine and for the other point of view, Cassian himself.

2.1 AD RUFINUM
The first known works of Prosper of Aquitaine are in fact two letters
which are closely associated with the Massilian controversy: the Epistola ad
Rufinum and the Epistola ad Augustinum.

Prosper tells us in the letter to

Augustine that it was by chance that he came to know of the book De
correptione et gratia, the work known to have been composed around 427 by

1. This date is not arbitrary of course. After Cassian's death (c. 435) the Massilian
controversy seems to have died down until it was revived (at a different level) in the last part
of the fifth century starting with Faustus of Riez (c. 473).
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Augustine as a second attempt to answer the objections of the monks at
Hadrumetum. Because of the similarity in the objections, Prosper thought this
book would settle all the Massilian grievances as well. However, this was not
to be the case. We note that in the letter to Rufinus Prosper seems to be
unaware of the existence of this book. This simple internal evidence is the
only reason to date ad Rufinum as the first of these two letters, probably
written around the end of 426 or beginning of 427.2
In general, the works of Prosper cannot be considered systematic
theological presentations by any stretch of the imagination. They belong to
the polemical or the apologetical genres.

The letter to Rufinus is no

exception. The arguments given employ the classical rhetorical techniques;
foremost among these, the arguments ex auctoritate and the reductio ad

absurdum or indirect argument. All this reflects a latin scholar trained in the
classical schools typical of Prospers time and cultural setting. Nevertheless,
despite his controversialist style of writing, we find that Prosper is able to go
to the heart of the theological issues involved.

In fact, this letter could be

considered a brief treatise on Prospers theology of grace. It is addressed to
a certain Rufinus -- not to be confused with his more famous namesake from
Aquileia -- who seems to have been simply a friend of Prosper and is
otherwise unknown in history. The letter itself is a relatively lengthy piece
divided into twenty sections including a prologue and an epilogue. There is
2. In the epilogue of the letter, Prosper reassures Rufinus that the opposition in Gaul will die
down just as in the case of another disturbance which had been quieted in another part of the
world ("Confide ergo in virtute misericordiae Dei, quoniam haec contradictio, sicut in allis
mundi partibus, ita et in his regionibus conquiescet."). This disturbance is probably the one in
Hadrumetum. Since Prosper suggests to Rufinus that he seek in Augustine's works further
enlightment on the questions on grace which are being debated but makes no mention of the
book as he does in the letter ad Augustinum, we assume that he probably had not seen the
work yet.
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no evidence that the purpose of this letter is anything other than that which is
specifically stated in its prologue, namely, to inform the addressee about the
rumors he may have heard on the brewing controversy and to reassure him
that it would subside quickly.3
In the first four sections of the letter, with characteristic Augustinian
emphasis, Prosper proposes to show that the teaching of the Gauls or
Massilians reduces to the opinion that God's grace is given in answer to
human merit or initiative. 4 Augustine himself tells us in his Retractiones (cf.
2.1) and his writings to Simplicianus, successor of Ambrose as bishop of
Milan, that he himself had held the opinion of the Massilians prior to 397.
Only his deep reflection on the Pauline text "what have you that you did not
receive?" (1 Cor 4, 7), led him to be convinced of his error and to his death he
defended the principle that God, in a completely gratuitous manner, gives us
not only the grace to be able to keep the commandments but even the grace
to take the first steps towards faith as well.5 For Prosper, it was obvious that
this same principle was a key issue in the nascent controversy with the
Massilians. Because of Augustine's fierce defense of the absolute gratuity of
grace in the Pelagian controversy and its association with the aforementioned
3. The tone of the entire letter gives no evidence to support R. Mathisen's statement that
Rufinus seems to have been an anti-Augustinian himseH. Cf. Ecclesiastical Factionalism
and Religious Controversy in Fifth-Century Gaul, CUA Press (1989), p. 125. For whatever
reason and without foundation, Mathisen also lends credibility to the notion that Prosper was
"a disenchanted Pelagian." (p. 129).
4. Actually, John Cassian who was perhaps the most able and certainly the most respected
spokesman for the Massilians held that the initiative towards a good will, the initium fidei
belongs to man in some cases as exemplified by Zacchaeus and the Good thief of the
gospel. This shall be a fundamental point of contention further elaborated in Prosper's
Contra Collatorem.

5. Ad Aug. 3.
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principle, from the very beginning Prosper associates the Massilians' tenets
with Pelagianism. This is another sense in which the term semipelagian is not
as historically inaccurate as some have asserted.6 But on the other hand,
one must realize that the term "semipelagian" would have been, in a way,
meaningless to Prosper.

His main concern at all times was to uphold the

absolute gratuity of grace, a point that the Pelagians were unable to concede
in their exaltation of human free will. Thus in Prospers view of the situation
one either took a Pelagian or a Catholic stance. There was no semi-position.
This view prevails unmitigated throughout Prosper's writings. His method of
logical argument is basically to force the opposition to choose between (1)
self-contradiction, (2) a position associated with the anathematized Pelagians
or (3) a position at odds with the authority of the councils which had
condemned Pelagianism, or the authority of the Apostolic See or against
Sacred Scripture itself which in fact is referenced over 50 times in this letter
alone.

Needless to say, these types of arguments were not to be easily

accepted by everyone involved, especially by the Massilians who always
distanced themselves from Pelagianism and consider themselves to be the
standard of orthodoxy. 7
Nevertheless,

after recognizing

the

shortcomings

of

Prosper's

rhetorical arguments and controversialist style, it would be erroneous to
conclude that Prosper held an altogether negative view of the Massilians
themselves or that his exposition of the issues distorted the Massilian position

6. For example, P. de Letter, ACW vol. 14, pg. 158, footnote 6.
7. A typical example is the Commonitorium, a work which is ascribed to Vincent of Lerins.
have also noted that Cassian severely criticized and equated Nestorius' rejection of the title
Theotokos with Pelagianism in his treatise De incarnatione. The association of Nestorianism

and Pelagianism was also made by Prosper in his brief Epitaphium Nestorianae.
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in any significant manner.

Despite some moral outrage at the slanderous

opinions which were being spread about Augustine8, Prosper acknowledges
in general the Massilians' good faith, moral integrity and virtue. He even goes
on to express his hope that God's mercy will delay somehow their advance in
error since it is because of their very zeal for virtue and the integrity of their
lives that they have run into danger.9

This is in clear contrast with the

Pelagians whom he calls "cunning sons of darkness who wished to be taken
for sons of light."10
8. Prosper intimates that in "many a conference" against Augustine (Ad Ruf. 4, PL 51, 80 A:
" .. .inter multas collationes ... "), the bishop of Hippo had been slandered as still tainted by
Manichean dualism and pagan fatalism. See also Prosper's Ad Aug. 3 and his answers to
the objections of the Gauls (Pro Augustina responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum
calumniantium 1).

9. Ad Rufinum 4 (PL 51, 80 B): "Ego quidem etiam hoc de divitiis misericordiae Dei spero,
quod quos nunc libero falli arbitrio suo, et ab humilitatis via patitur evagari, non usquequaque
neque in finem sit intelligentia fraudaturus: sed hunc ipsum in longinquiora progressum, ideo
ab eo tardius revocari, ut opus gratiae ejus majore gloria celebretur, cum sibi etiam
adversantium corda subdiderit, quibus de virtutum studio exortum est periculum, et de morum
probitate discrimen."
10. Ibid. (PL 51, 78C): " .. .filii tenebrarum in similitudinem filiorum lucis transfigurare
voluerunt, ... "
Despite his insistence that when not entirely ascribing the initium fidei to divine grace
one would logically end up with Pelagianism, Prosper did not fail to distinguish the essential
theological differences between the Massilians and the Pelagians. Augustine himself had
written: "Pervenerunt autem isti frates nostri, pro quibus sollicita est pia charitas vestra, ut
credant cum Ecclesia Christi, peccato primi hominis obnoxium nasci genus humanum, nee ab
isto malo nisi per iustitiam secundi hominis aliquem liberari. Pervenerunt etiam, ut praeveniri
voluntates hominum Dei gratia fateantur, atque ad nullum opus bonum vel incipiendum vel
perficiendum sibi quemquam sufficere posse consentiant. Retenta ergo ista in quae
pervenerunt, plurimum eos a pelagianorum errore discernunt." (De praed. sanct. 1, 2). As J.
Chene has pointed out ("Que signifiaient lnitium fidei et Affectus Credulitatis pour les
Semipelagiens?" in Recherches de Science Religieuse 35 (1948): 566-88), Prosper makes a
distinction even among the Massilians themselves by discriminating between two groups
among them. These two groups are defined following the expressions "multi ergo servorum
Christi" (Ad Aug. 2 and 3) and "quidam vero horum" (Ad Aug. 4f). The former are mainly
those who reject some of the Augustinian teachings as innovation and the latter consist of
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After the first four sections of this letter to Rufinus which refer to the
general situation, Prosper begins a more nuanced discussion of a key issue in
the controversy, the initium fidei.11 He begins by referring to a large number
of texts from Sacred Scripture to refute the claims of the Massilians.
However, the Massilians used several of the same texts to bolster their own
position.

Faced with this situation, Prosper specifies a principle of his

exegetical argument which he will use repeatedly, especially later on against
Cassian's exegetical methods.

This principle states that to prove a

proposition one should used texts which cannot be understood both in favor
and opposed to that proposition. Moreover, Prosper questions the selective
use of Scripture on the part of the Massilians who argue by using Mat 11, 2830 but avoid Jn 5, 21; 6, 44. 66; 15, 5; Lk 10, 22 and "all other unchangeable
texts which cannot be interpreted in a twisted sense."12 Among the texts
used by the Massilians to show what human free will and good desires are
able to accomplish is the story of Cornelius in the Acts of the Apostles. But
Prosper points out that the entire preparation of Cornelius to receive baptism
was in itself a gift of grace. The voice that spoke to Peter ["that which God

those that approach or actually fall into some of the Pelagian errors. As late as 432 Prosper
writes: "Quorum intus interstrepens domestica malignitas non minus spernenda esset, quam
foris latrans haeretica loquacitas; nisi ejectis extra ovile Dominicum lupis, qui sub nomine
ovium sunt suffragarentur, essentque ejusmodi ut nee ordo eorum in Ecclesia nee ingenia
despicienda videantur." (Contra Collatorem 1, 1) For Prosper, although they may favor the
"wolves" which have been "ejected from the Lord's fold," the Massilians were still "of the fold."
11 . No doubt the question of predestination and the divine salvific will played important roles
in the controversy. But a careful look indicates that the issue of the gratuity of grace and in
particular the issue of the beginning of faith was at the foundation of all the problems in the
dispute.
12. Ad Ruf. 5: "Quae omnia cum sint incommutabilia, et nequeant ulla interpretatione in
sensum alium detorqueri, ... "
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has cleansed, do not call unclean" Acts 10, 15], shows that it was God's grace
which had purified Cornelius and had initiated all the good works that
preceded his baptism.
In the next four sections Prosper continues to discuss the question of
the absolute gratuity of God's gifts which include not only faith but charity, as
well as perseverance in virtue, and in fact, free will itself. Once again Prosper
relies on Sacred Scripture in his argument linking faith with charity which
comes strictly from God. A fundamental Augustinian outlook is at this point
expressed by Prosper when he states that while we may be able to perform
worthy and admirable deeds, if they are without charity they only resemble
holiness.13 In arguing that free will can do nothing without grace and in fact it
is grace which sets it free14, Prosper uses the example of Peter, who had
made a great promise on his own ["Lord, at your side I am prepared to face
imprisonment and death itself" Lk 22, 33] but was first allowed to fall and then
later restored to virtue and perseverance less he thought he stood firm in his
free will.
Although it is defined in the context of the larger issue of the absolute
gratuity of God's grace, the question of predestination is hardly discussed in
this letter.15 In section 11 Prosper mentions one of the reasons that some
refuse to admit the absolute gratuity of grace as expressed in the Augustinian

13. Ibid. 8: "Ouia scilicet multa laudabilia atque miranda possunt in homine reperiri, quae
sine charitatis medullis habent quidem pietatis similitudinem, sed non habent veritatem."
Prosper recognized the human ability to do "good" in a natural sense but certainly not in the
sense that in and of themselves these works have any salutary value.
14. Ibid. 10: " ... , quod donec sine Deo solum fuit, mortuum fuit justitiae, vixitque peccato .... "
15. It is noteworthy that predestination is not discussed directly in Prosper's main work
against Cassian.
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system; they would be compelled then to admit that the number of the elect
according to God's decree is fixed and definite with God. The conclusion that
the number of the elect is certain and will neither increased nor decrease had
been particularly difficult for many of the monks to accept. Many looked with
horror upon this teaching

thinking

that

it

would

have devastating

consequences in the pastoral aspects of exhorting anyone to lead a life of
virtue. But this notion of the numerus clausus or numerus certus, viewed by
some as too rigid, was the logical conclusion of a more basic idea; the notion
of a divine predilection.

This means that in creating the world, God has

decided to give grace to each individual as he sees fit. This divine grace
leads all the elect -- freely but infallibly in God's creative decision -- to their
salvation. In this sense, God "has decided" effectively the number of the elect
by this decision.16 Prosper maintained that only those will be saved who God
knows will wish to cooperate with the grace decreed for them. The subtle
difference with the Massilian position is easily missed. They taught that only
the human free will, by resisting or consenting to grace, decides whether one
will be saved or lost. So for instance, in the Massilian view Judas Iscariot in
fact "had been" one of the elect before his fall. For Prosper, this view was
simply a denial of God's infallible knowledge, who unknown to anyone but
himself has by an act of will chosen to create and provide the graces in a

16. Part of the difficulty in discussing predestination and God's foreknowledge (prescience)
lies in the fact that we have to speak with the concepts and language of our own finite
experience. And of course, we are not justified in assuming that God's experience is in terms
of past, present and future. There is no doubt that Augustine was very much aware of the
limitations of language but the issue is complicated because at times Augustine seems to
speak as if some are actually predestinated to condemnation (not just foreknown to be
condemned). Nevertheless, one must be sensitive to the fact that the Augustinian expression
in the case of the numerus certus does not wish to go beyond asserting the absolute gratuity
of grace. This is clear from the context.
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world where very definitely God sees Peter repent and Judas despair.17
Augustine also had written; "Since the Lord raised Lazarus, he no doubt could
do it; but since he did not raise Judas, is it reasonable to say he could not do
it? He could, but did not wish to."18 For Augustine, the term "will" referred
mostly to "efficacious will" as later theology would specify.

As far as the

reasons for God's choice, let us note that Prosper, following Augustine,
emphasizes the idea of the inscrutability of God's judgments: "O the depth
and the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are
his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! (Rom 11, 33).
In section 13 and following Prosper describes in more detail the
meaning of the universal salvific will of God for the Massilians. He considers
trite the interpretation which the Massilians give to 1 Tim 2, 4. For he asks,
are all who died without having known God from ages past till now numbered
among "all men" whom God has "willed" to come to the knowledge of truth?
Even granting that for adults the evil works they did were the obstacle for their
salvation, what difference in merit could there be between infants who are
saved and infants who are not? Following Augustine once again, Prosper
asserts that if only human merits were considered humanity could actually be
justly condemned for in Adam all have sinned.19
17. The point is that God could have created another world in which Judas would have been
converted and Peter would have remained unrepented independently of the merits of Peter
and Judas.
18. De natura et gratia 7, 8: "Quia enim Dominus Lazarum suscitavit, sine dubio potuit: quia
vero ludam non suscitavit, numquid dicendum est: 'Non potuit?' Potuit ergo, sed noluit."
19. Ad Ruf. 13 (PL 51, 85 B): "Si meritum consideres, non una pars salvari meruit, sed
utraque damnari; quia omnibus in Adae praevacatione prostraris, nisi quosdam assumeret
misericors gratia, maneret super universos inculpata iustitia." The presupposition is that not
all are saved.
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In the last two sections Prosper recapitulates his answer to the
objections that God's grace leaves nothing to human free will. It is true, he
says, that in the case of infants there is apparently no act nor desire of the
will. And those who have deathbed conversions are saved through baptism
at their last breath as it were. But with the eyes of faith, he adds, we can see
that when left unaided free will in fact acts to its own perdition but when
graced the same free will is turned to God and not destroyed. In the epilogue,
Prosper once again alludes to and then dismisses as statements without
foundation certain charges raised against Augustine; that in fact, the bishop of
Hippo teaches fatalism or that perhaps he is still affected by the Manichean
dualism which he dabbled with in his youth and thus feels the need to divide
humanity into the elect and the reprobate.

2.2 AD AUGUSTINUM
This second letter of Prosper, in style, in purpose and even in length, is
substantially different from the first one. From the preface of the letter we
learn that this was not Prosper's first letter to Augustine. He had written to
him previously and had obtained an answer from Augustine through a deacon
by the name of Leontius. Unfortunately, both the letter and the reply have
been lost in history.
In this letter to Augustine, Prosper summarizes the main tenets of the
Massilians. First of all, they did believe that all had sinned in Adam and that
regeneration can come only through God's grace. They also believed that
grace is offered indiscriminately to all and thus anyone willing to approach
faith and baptism could be saved. So in a sense we "predestine" ourselves.
Moreover, God had foreseen from all eternity the merits of those who would
believe and whose faith would then be assisted by grace, a reward for their
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willingness.

Consequently, the objections described by Prosper which the

Massilians raise against Augustine's teachings fall basically into two
categories:

(1) objections against the Augustinian view of the universal

salvific will of God which the Massilians viewed as too restrictive.
objections against the Augustinian teaching on

(2)

divine election and

predestination which the Massilian viewed as an innovation or worse (e.g.,
fatalism or Manichean dualism).

In fact, for the Massilians predestination

meant little more than God's foreknowledge of human merit.

Thus, for

instance, they held that a dying infant was saved by the grace of baptism
simply because God foreknew the merits of the child if that child had lived to a
more mature age. Such a view could not possibly be correct, Prosper argued,
since it is meaningless to say that God "foreknows" what will never be.
However, the objections related to the Augustinian exposition of the divine
salvific will were more substantial. Furthermore, it seems that Prosper was
either unwilling or perhaps not completely able at this stage to provide a clear
alternative to certain elements in the Massilian position.
Prosper also summarized in the form of several requests his reasons
for writing to Augustine. The first request to the bishop of Hippo was for
Augustine to show that a point of faith was indeed at stake in the matter of
attributing the beginning of salvation to the human will.

Once this was

established, the second request was to show how the human free will is not
hindered by divine grace which precedes and cooperates with it. The third
request was on the issue of predestination itself and its relationship to God's
foreknowledge and God's decree (divinum propositum).
These requests and the form which they take in the letter are
indications that Prosper turned to Augustine not only because of the weight of
cla~n~~~
/,,
'

the bishop's authority but also from a genuine need for

,

'
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personal level. I speculate that Prosper did not feel yet at home with all the
Augustinian system. In reality, there is no reason why we should assume that
Prosper did at this early stage. Also, Prosper seems personally impressed by
several of the Massilians some of whom are "renowned for the sanctity of
their lives and the dignity of their rank."20

2.3 CARMEN DE INGRATIS
Augustine did have time to comply with the requests of Prosper and his
associate Hilarius and shortly before his death in 430, he composed the
books known to us as the De praedestinatione sanctorum and the De dono
perseverantiae but originally appeared as one bipartite work.21

Prosper

himself did not wait idly for the Augustinian reply. He composed the Carmen
de ingratis or ITEPI AXAPIBTON which is essentially a poetic version of

the two Prosperian letters previously discussed. This unique work must have
been composed sometime after 428 and before 431.22
The poem consists of 1002 hexameters (plus a preface and an
introduction of ten and eleven lines respectively) in which Prosper

20. Ad Aug. 9. Prosper mentions by name, Hilarius (not his layman associate but the bishop
of Aries) whom he describes as an saintly admirer and follower of Augustine in all other
points of his doctrine ("Hilarium Arelatensem episcopum, sciat beatitudo tua admiratorem
sectatoremque in aliis omnibus tuae esse doctrinae.")
21. Ad excerpta Genuensium (PL 51, 187 A): "In libris beatae memoriae Augustini episcopi,
quorum titulus est de Praedestinatione Sanctorum, ..."
22. This is deduced from the fact that in the poem itseH there is no reference to Ephesus
(431) when Prosper recalls the authorities condemning Pelagianism. But in his Contra
Col/atorem 21, 2 (PL 51, 271 C), we find the following: " ... , quando Cyrillo Alexandrinae urbi
antistiti, gloriosissimo fidei catholicae defensori ad exsecandam Nestorianam impietatem,
apostolico auxiliatus est gladio; quo etiam Pelagiani, dum cognatis confoederantur erroribus,
iterum prosternerentur."
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summarizes the Pelagian teachings and the history of that controversy (verse
1 to verse 113).

He shows why Pelagianism is logically a parent to the

teachings of the Massilians (114-225) and then proceeds to summarize and
refute their two main tenets, namely that faith and good desires may be
initiated solely from our free will and that God wills the salvation of all in the
sense that he predestines everyone equally to salvation and gives to all equal
grace (226-564).

He further reviews the arguments of the Massilians,

concentrating in refuting their examples (565-800) and concludes by
associating once again Pelagianism with the Massilian position (801-1002).
The Carmen de ingratis is a passionate and unique piece of poetry. It
is certainly more polemical in tone than any other work in the Prosperian
corpus. Not surprisingly, even a careful reading of this poem does not seem
to yield anything new or different from the positions Prosper has already
espoused in his previous two letters. The Carmen does not contribute any
new arguments to his prosaic works nor is there any evidence of a
development in thought.

It seems that the poem was written with the

Pelagians as well as the Massilians in mind.

Its purpose may have been

simply to show, in the unique style of poetry, their close ties rather than to
deal with new questions and developments.

2.4 RESPONSES TO THE EXCERPTS OF THE GENOESE
From the books De Praedestinatione Sanctorum and De dono
perseverantiae, two priests from Genoa23 extracted several passages which
they found to be either novel or not very clear. They sent them to Prosper for
23. The priests were Camillus and Theodorus, from Genoa, although an alternative reading
of "Genuensium" as "Agenuensium" would make them natives of Agen. This has been
proposed by G. de Plinval, "Prosper d'Aquitaine: interprete de saint Augustin" Recherches
Augustiniennes 1 (1958): 339-55.
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further clarification, something which seemed the natural thing to do perhaps
since the books had been addressed to Prosper (and Hilarius) and Augustine
had already died by this time. There were a total of ten excerpts, the first
seven from De praedestinatione sanctorum. Prosper answers the first three
excerpts together (taken from DPS 1, 3) beginning once again with a brief
description of how Augustine initially had thought that the reason for God
electing one for grace and not electing another (as exemplified in the case of
twins such as Jacob and Esau) must have been simply his foreknowledge of
the merits of one and the demerits of the other. After concisely but clearly
examining the Pelagian concept of grace and its proximity with such an
opinion, Prosper exhorts the priests to see the unreasonableness of anyone
preferring Augustine's imperfect knowledge as a young man to his mature
understanding.24 In this answer, it should be noted how Prosper's notion of
grace is based on humanity's fallen state and the healing character of grace,
two fundamental notions in the Augustinian theology of grace.
The next two excerpts are extremely short and deal with God's
preparation of the will of the elect from the beginning of faith until final
perseverance. Behind the requested clarification for these excerpts there is,
no doubt, the veiled but understandable desire of the inquiring priests to make
the reality of the Augustinian teaching on divine election sound less rigid. For
if God prepares in the elect the will to believe so that faith both from the
beginning and in its fulfillment is a gift, the natural human question is why is
this gift not given to all? Prosper's answer, which in fact he continues in the
response to excerpt 6, is essentially this: the reason that this gift is not given

24. As noted, Augustine's earlier views were used sometimes against him by some of his
detractors.
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to all is hidden in the mystery of God himself. 25

With the eyes of faith,

Prosper adds, if a gift is apparently not given to all it should not disturbed any
of the faithful as if our knowledge of God, who does not will what is unjust,
should not be limited by our very human nature. Prosper's attitude is once
again quite similar to Augustine's own.

Their keen, inquisitive minds did not

forget to accept and even sensed whenever they approached the threshold of
a mystery of faith.
Excerpt 7 is not in the line of thought of the previous ones. In fact, it
belongs to a much later chapter in the Augustinian work from where it is taken
(De praed. sanct., 16, 33). Prosper states that in context the excerpt is so
obvious that he wonders why the two consultants extracted it. The excerpt
deals with God's providence and the fact that humans have the power to sin
but even the effects of human sinful actions are used to achieve God's own
designs and divine purpose.

Prosper emphasizes that just because God

makes use of the "darkness" (tenebras) it does not mean that the darkness is
without guilt nor does it mean that God is the author of that darkness.
The last two excerpts are from De dono perseverantiae (14, 35f and
15, 38). Actually, there was a third excerpt which is omitted by Prosper who
says it should have been joined more properly to excerpt 8 and accordingly
he answers them as if they had been one. Excerpt 8 is interesting on two
accounts.

First of all, it provides us with Augustine's precise definition of

predestination: it is the divine foreknowledge and preparation of the gifts by
which God saves infallibly all those that are in fact saved.

Secondly, the

25. The position runs the risk of being disparaged as "fideism" or "agnosticism" by a more
rationalist outlook. Cf. P. De Letter's translation of De vocatione omnium gentium, Ancient
Christian Writers, vol. 14 (1952), footnotes 76 and 181. But in reality it is an integral aspect
of Prosper's theology of grace without which it cannot be understood.
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excerpt from Augustine contains the gospel passage were the towns of
Chorazin and Bethsaida are upbraided by Christ for their ingratitude (Matt 11,
21 ). Prosper's answer does not attempt to systematize. What else can be
said besides that cities (such as Sidon and Tyre) were not given to have faith
and that the gospel states that they would have believed if they had seen
Christ's miracles? We simply cannot fathom why the Lord worked miracles
for people in Bethsaida and Chorazin (who apparently did not profit by them)
but did not work them for others in Sidon and Tyre (who apparently would
have profited by them according to his own testimony in the gospel!).
Excerpt 9 is a parody of what an Augustinian sermon on predestination
would be like. It deals with the often repeated accusation that the Augustinian
teachings renders any exhortation to the practice of Christian virtue useless.
This excerpt also deals with the issue of the wisdom in preaching
predestination to the ordinary Christian for the same practical reasons, even
assuming that the Augustinian teaching were true.

Following Augustine,

Prosper considers that it is necessary to preach to the Church both about
predestination which is the preparation of grace and about grace which is the
effect of predestination and the prescience of God who knows from all eternity
how he would bestow this grace. Prosper adds without ambiguity that anyone
opposed to the preaching of this doctrine is simply giving support to the
Pelagian heresy or at least helping to exalt their views.26
26. Ad exc. Gen. (PL 51, 200 D): "Cujus praedicationis quisquis est impugnator,
apertissimus est Pelagianae elationis adjutor."
Despite the separation of twelve centuries, it is interesting to compare this attitude
with the opinion that St. Ignatius of Loyola gives for his era in his Spiritual Exercises, rules 14
and 15. He writes, "Dado que sea mucha verdad que ninguno se puede salvar sin ser
predestinado y sin tener fe y gracia, es mucho de advertir en el modo de hablar y comunicar
de todas ellas." Loyola continues, "No debemos hablar mucho de la predestinaci6n por via
de costumbre; mas si en alguna manera y algunas veces se hablare, asf se hable que el
pueblo menudo no venga en error alguno, como algunas veces suele, diciendo: Si tengo de
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2.5 RESPONSES TO THE OBJECTIONS OF THE GAULS
After Augustine's death, Prosper entered into some sort of pamphlet
duel with the more anti-Augustinian faction in Southern France.

The Pro

Augustina responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Ga/forum calumniantium is

one of two surviving testimonies of that extreme polemic, although the text of
the Gallic objections itself is known to us only by Prosper's responses.
The most obvious structural division of this work is that it consists of
two parts. The first part deals with fifteen articles or capitula each supposedly
an Augustinian doctrine or a logical consequence thereof, followed by
Prosper's corresponding response. In the second part, Prosper summarizes
each response with a sententia or qualification for each article in less
ambiguous language.27
Prosper's intention is clearly stated in the preface.

By following

faithfully the points of doctrine which Augustine has expounded on grace,
Prosper wishes to show even a hurried reader that his detractors are totally
unjust.28 Despite the polemical character of the work, it is extremely useful in

ser salvo o condemnado, ya esta determinado, y por mi bien hacer o mal, no puede ser ya
otra cosa; y con esto entorpeciendo se descuidan en las obras que conducen a la salud y
provecho spiritual de sus animas." Ejercicios Espirituales, BAC vol. 245 (edici6n bilingOe),
with commentary by Luis Gonzalez, S. I. and Ignacio lparraguirre, S. I., pp. 127-28.

Resp. ad Gall. (PL 51, 169 D): "Quamvis ergo ad omnes obiectiones seu querulae
imperitiae, seu fallacis invidiae, planissime ac plenissime, quantum Dominus dedit, existimem
esse responsum, professionem tamen sensus nostri etiam in brevia coarctemus; ut sub
paucorum verborum simplicitate magis magisque appareat nos quod de supra scriptis
capitulis intelligimus, nulla circumloquendi arte praetexere, sed absolute ac libere et prava
respuere, et consensum probabilibus non negare."
27.

28. Ibid. (PL 51, 156-57 A): " .. .in nullo recedens a tramite earum defintionum quae in sancti
viri disputationibus continentur; ut facile vel tenuis diligentiae advertat inspector, quam injustis
opprobriis catholici praedicatoris mernoria carpatur..."
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attempting to reconstruct the undergirding structure in Prosper's theology of
grace.
The first article of the Gauls refers to the charge that Augustine's
teaching on predestination promotes fatalism and in fact, by predestination
some would be necessarily compelled to sin. As I have noted, this charge of
fatalism is recurrent in the controversy and was commented upon by Prosper
in both of his letters and even by Augustine in his Contra duas epist. Pel., II;
5, 9.

The doctrine of original sin, not directly addressed in much of the

controversy, enters into Prospers answer when he explains that the objection
is a total distortion of the Augustinian teaching on predestination and that the
propensity to evil does not come from God's creation but from the sin of our
first parents.
The second article is another distortion which states that in the nonelect, original sin is not cleansed by the sacrament of baptism. Somewhat
inconsistently, the third article states that baptism is of no use to the nonelect, not because of its failure to cleanse them from original sin, but because
of its ultimate ineffectiveness since in fact, God allows these people (the nonelect) to live until they fall into mortal sin and then -- and only then -- does
God take them out of this world to perish eternally. Some have claimed that
Prosper in this answer teaches a predestination post previsa demerita which
goes explicitly beyond Augustine.29 There is little doubt that part of this claim
is accurate since Prosper clearly writes, "It is not God who forsook them that
they should forsake him; it is they who forsook him and then were

29. Cf. P. De Letter, ACW, vol 14, p. 223, footnote 11.
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forsaken."30

But as far as going explicitly beyond Augustine, one would do

well to recall -- among several other texts to the same effect -- Augustine's
answer to Felix the Manichean. Despite his much maligned massa damnata
outlook of humanity, Augustine's answer is noteworthy.

To Augustine's

remarks that the god of the Manicheans seemed cruel, Felix had replied that
Christ seemed just as cruel since he allowed many to be condemned.
Augustine replied that those that perished had not been saved because in fact
they did not will it. Apparently Felix could not believe his ears! "Because they
did not will it, is this what you said?!" to which Augustine replied: "I said it,
because they did not will it."31

In other words, Augustine in this dialogue

teaches implicitly a reprobation depending on personal demerits. After all,
Augustine never said that because of original sin we should have all been
condemned, but only that we could have been, especially if the only thing that
counted were our merits.
The fourth article states simply that "not all men are called to grace."
Prosper answers that this is not a correct way of speaking even though some
to whom the gospel has been announced do not obey the call.

In other

words, they have not been called to, using an anachronistic term, efficacious
30. Ad excerpta Gen. 3 (PL 51, 159 B): "Non enim relicti sunt a Deo, ut relinquerent Deum:
sed reliquerunt, et relicti sunt, et ex bono in malum propria voluntate mutati sunt."
31. Contra Felicem II, 8 (CSEL 25, 835):
Fel. dixit: Crudelem adseritis Manichaeum haec dicemtem; de Christo quid dicimus, qui dixit:
ite in ignem aeternum?
Aug. dixit: Peccatoribus hoc dixit.
Fel. dixit: lsti peccatores quare non purgati sunt?
Aug. dixit: Quia noluerunt.
Fel. dixit: Quia noluerunt, hoc dixisti?
Aug. dixit: Hoc dixi, quia noluerunt..
Similarly in De natura et gratia 26, 29 Augustine writes that God "non deserit si non
deseratur."
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grace. The statement in the article is true, Prosper adds, only if "all men"
includes those to whom the gospel has not yet been announced and only if by
grace one means the hearing of the gospel. Article 5 is related to the very
same question and once again Prosper differentiates between "call" and
"grace".
Article 6 is the objection that predestination destroys the human free
will.

Thus the reprobate are not able to do good, while the elect are

compelled to it. This objection is interesting from the point of view that it
assumes the Pelagian view of human free will, that is, the ability to choose
equally between evil and good. Obviously, this could not be further from any
Augustinian presuppositions.
In article 7 we seem to encounter once again the teaching of
reprobation post praevisa demerita.

In particular, the grace of final

perseverance is denied to some not because God did not set them apart from
the reprobate but they were reprobated in God's foreknowledge of their
demerits.

Notice the subtle difference between this statement about

reprobation and the statement that God's foreknowledge of human merits
positively does not enter into the process of divine election.
Article 8 is perhaps the only objection which is validly based on the
Augustinian system.

Perhaps this is the reason why Prosper's answer is

longer than any other in this work. The article simply states that God does not
will all to be saved except those he has predestined. Obviously, we should
distinguish among the different possible meanings of the word "will" in
Augustine's writings (I shall return to this point in the next chapter).
We should also note that in Prospers response the two themes which
are recurrent in his arguments associated to the divine salvific will. First of all,
the why of it all is not possible for us to understand and in fact it is dangerous
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inquisitiveness to try to decipher it. Secondly, the absense of a free act of will
in the case of baptized dying infants helps to illustrate as clearly as it could be
illustrated that human free will cannot be considered the determining factor in
God's choice of the elect. However, Prosper does not deny, as we have seen
in articles 2 and 7, that human free will is instrumental in determining
reprobation.32

Moreover, Prosper clearly states that God takes care of all

and that there is no one that either by the preaching of the gospel or the Law
or the dictates of human conscience does not receive God's call.33

He

makes clear however that we should not understand the statement that all
gifts come from God in the sense that they were given to us in our very
creation by the Author of our nature.34 This shows that Prosper maintained
a distinction on something modern theology claims to have "rediscovered"
about Pelagius.

In other words, Prosper knew the distinction between

denying "grace" a priori and shifting categories to mean by "grace" simply
"nature" or "free will" as Pelagius had done.
In article 8 we also find another important element in Prosper's
theology of grace; namely, the Augustinian idea of grace as healing grace.
Prosper writes that even though in the beginning humanity had the power of
knowing and doing what is right, we lost it "in quo omnes peccavimus."
Accordingly, we are in need of being renewed in Christ, "in quo sumus nova
creatura."

32. Cf. also De vocatione omnium gentium 1, 13; 1, 21; 2, 9.
33. Ad capitula Gall. (PL 51, 164 B): "Omnium ergo hominum cura est Deo: et nerno est
quern non aut evangelica praedicatio, aut legis testificatio, aut ipsa etiam natura conveniat."
34. Ibid.: "Neque haec dona ita ex Deo esse opinemur, ut quia ipse naturae nostrae auctor
est, per conditionem iam haec contulisse videatur."
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Article 9 states that the Augustinian doctrine denies that Christ dies for
the redemption of all. This same objection will be seen next in the Vincentian
articles.

Prosper's answer is basic.

There is a distinction between

redemption in the sense that Christ did die on the cross for the benefit of all
and redemption in the sense that not all profit from his sacrifice. Obviously in
the former case redemption is absolutely universal and in the latter case it is
not.
Article 1O is yet another crude distortion of an Augustinian teaching. It
states that the Lord withholds from some people the gospel message so that
they are not saved. The answer given once again points out that the question
as to why the gospel has been preached to some nations or individuals and
not others transcends our understanding of God.
Article 11 is a rehash of article 1 while in article 12 we find a basic
misunderstanding clearly explained. It is the equating of predestination with
God's foreknowledge.35

Although God foreknows the good as well as the

evil, he only wills the good. What is evil he neither wills nor in any way he
inspires or compels humans to do. In articles 14 and 15 Prosper comes back

35. When Augustine considers predestination connected with God's foreknowlege, he means
the foreknowledge of gifts. This is totally different from the foreknowledge of merits. It is only
God's foreknowledge of gifts (not of merits) which directs and assures God's desired results
of predestination. Thomas Smith in his Ph. D. dissertation (Notre Dame 1989, preprint, p. 87)
does not carefully distinguish that and ascribes to Augustine a confusion that is not there.
Smith writes; ''The root of the problem of those who misunderstand divine foreknowledge is
their failure to distinguish between foreknowledge and predestination. One might point out
here that those who make such an equation do so with good Augustinian precedent, but in

11.3 (of the De gratia) Faustus argues precisely that the two are not to be seen as equivalent."
Prosper is so clearly aware of this difference that this is one of his main criticisms of
the Massilians' understanding of the universal salvific will as we also saw in our discussion of
his letters. Furthermore, it is simply not possible to hold that Augustine was not also well
aware of this distinction if we realize that he actually differentiates between foreknowledge of
merits and divine gifts.
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to the same point presenting an additional way of maintaining the proper
difference: foreknowledge can exist without predestination but predestination
cannot exist without foreknowledge.
Finally, article 13 is the idea that even the non-elect serve a temporal
purpose in God's providential design (cf. extract 7 of the Genoese excerpts)
twisted to mean that the non-elect were selected for condemnation from the
beginning of creation.

2.6 RESPONSES TO THE VINCENTIAN ARTICLES
The sixteen Vincentian articles, also unknown except by Prosper's text,
appear to have been even more violent and crude in tone than the previously
discussed articles of the Gauls. They were without doubt distortions of the
Augustinian teachings with the definite purpose of trying to discredit them.
Understandably, Prosper's answer, the Pro Augustina responsiones ad
capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum, is the shortest of his works associated
to the controversy after Augustine's death.
Among other things, according to these sixteen articles Augustine
supposedly taught that Christ did not die for all humanity (1) and that God
does not want the salvation of all (2, 7, 8 and 9). As a matter of fact, he
created the greater part of humanity for its own damnation (3 and 4) refusing
to consider the free will of those eventually reprobated (6). Therefore, God
himself has to be considered the author of sin, even the most hideous crimes
of adulteries, violations of consecrated virgins (10) and incests (11 ).

By

predestination, God denies the means of repentance and salvation to a vast
number of people turning them into "sons of the devil" (12, 13, 14 and 15).
The irony of ironies is that, without knowing, the non-elect ask for their own
damnation in the Lord's prayer when they say, "Thy will be done" (16).
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Prosper's description of this pamphlet as a "diabolical catalog"
containing

the

"most

blasphemous

falsehoods"36

is

rhetorical

but

understandable. However, there are some things which could be extracted
from this work to contribute towards a positive construction of Prosper's
theology of grace.

In Prospers answer to article 2, we find perhaps the

clearest statement summarizing Prosper's position on the divine salvific will.
He writes:
"Truth itself says: If you who are evil, give good things to your
children, how much more will your Father in heaven give good things to
those who ask? (Mat 7, 11 ). How could it be that God, who saves
those of whom it cannot be said that they wish to be saved, does not
save some others who wish to be saved, unless for some reason,
hidden to us but well judged by him of whom it cannot be said he had
to do anything in any other way than he actually did? Thus, staying
away from the reasons for which divine knowledge keeps the secrets
of his justice hidden, it is most sincerely to be believed and professed
that God wills the salvation of all; since the apostle, whose sentence
this is, insists on that command most piously observed in all churches
that prayers be offered to God for all. Of those, if many perish, they
perish because of their fault. If many are saved, they are saved by a
gift. When a sinner (reus) is condemned, it is through God's blameless
justice. But if a sinner is justified, it is through God's ineffable gift of
grace."37

36. Ad cap. obiect. Vine. (PL 51, 177 A): " ... blasphemiarum prodigiosa mendacia; ... esse
qualia diabolico continentur indiculo."
37. Ad cap. obiect. Vine. (PL 51, 179 Band C): "Cum veritas dicat: Si vos cum sitis mali,
nostis bona data dare filiis vestris, quanto magis Pater vester coelestis dabit bona petentibus
se? (Mat 7, 11 ). Qui fieri potest ut Deus, qui etiam illos salvat, de quibus dici non potest quod
salvari velint, nolit aliquos salvare etiam si salvari velint, nisi aliquae causae exsistant de
quibus, quamvis sint nobis ingnoscibiles, ille tamen ben judicat, de quo dici non potest, aliter
eum quidquam facere debuisse quam fecerit? Remota ergo hac discretione, quam divina
scientia intra secretum justitiae suae continet, sincerissime credendum atque profitendum est
Deum velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant. Siquidem Apostolus, cujus ista sententia est
sollicitissime praecipit, quod omnibus Ecclesiis piissime custoditur, ut Deo pro omnibus
hominibus supplicetur: ex quibus quod multi pereunt, pereuntium est meritum; quod multi
salvantur, salvantis est donum. Ut enim reus damnetur, inculpabilis Dei justitia est; ut autem
reus justificetur, ineffabilis Dei gratia est."
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Note once again the statement on reprobation which is decided taking
into consideration our demerits. Also note the recurrent themes of 1) the
absolute gratuity of God's gift of election (in other words, without
consideration of merits), and 2) the inscrutability and justice of God's
decisions.
The other point of interest which comes up in Prosper's answer to
article 5 is the language Prosper uses to answer the accusation that God is
the author of our sins. The charge, he says, comes from the same source
which affirms that human nature is free from Adam's sin and remained
unharmed. But in fact, Prosper proceeds, we only admit God as the creator
of our nature not of sin. Human nature had in its power to sin; and it did sin,
freely, and because of it, human nature became enslaved.

This is the

language of Augustine who sometimes is misunderstood as denying human
free will when he says that in sinning we lost our freedom which cannot be
recovered except through Christ the savior. The point is that from the context
of Prosper's explanation, "freedom" obviously does not refer to "free will". It
refers to freedom from sin, the ultimate freedom according to Augustine.

2.7 CONTRA COLLATOREM
This is Prosper's longest work in the controversy with the Massilians. It
was written around 432 judging from some internal evidence 38 and it could
be considered his mature thought on several of the theological issues
38. Augustine's first writing against the Pelagians is dated around 412. In the first chapter of
the Contra Collatorem Prosper writes, "Viginti et eo amplius anni sunt, quod contra inimicos
gratiae Dei catholica acies, hujus viri ductu pugnat et vincit." Therefore, we can calculate that
the time of composition should be roughly 412 + 20 = 432. Also, from Prosper's words("... ,
confidimus Domini protectione praestadum, ut quod operatus est in lnnocentio, Zosimo,
Bonifacio, Coelestino, operetur in Sixto ... " PL 51, 275 C) we can infer that Sixtus Ill (432-440)
had not been pope for long.
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involved.

The book consists of 22 chapters, one of which (chapter 19)

summarily extracts 12 propositions from Cassian's XIII Conference as
examples of his opinions. Only the first proposition is considered by Prosper
to be a true Catholic position.
The Contra Collatorem of Prosper is not, and does not pretend to be, a
systematic theological presentation although it attempts to be a methodical,
step by step look at Cassian's own work. There is no evident structural logic
to the book besides the fact that Prosper seems to return time and time again
to a central theme: Cassian's inconsistency. It is noteworthy that in the XIII
Conference Cassian does not deal directly with issues such as predestination.

And in fact neither does Prosper in the Contra Collatorem. He concentrates
on only one issue for the greater part of the book; the question of the initium
fidei.

There is no mention of the word "predestination" and whenever any

other disputed point is discussed, it is always within the context of the
fundamental issue of the absolute gratuity of divine grace. This fact highlights
two things. First of all, it shows that Prosper does make an honest attempt to
follow Cassian's own agenda and tries to take him at his printed word without
significant distortions in the theological aspects of the dispute.39 Secondly, it
further illustrates how the understanding of the initium fidei is the key issue in
the entire dispute. At least this seems to be so in the case with Cassian, the
ablest and most nuanced thinker among the Massilians
In Chapter 1 of the Contra Collatorem we find many the general
complaints which Prosper has towards the Massilians (he is not addressing
Cassian at this stage yet). He defends Augustine as always, exaggerating
39. However, I do not deny that in his rhetorical style perhaps Prosper sometimes magnifies
and ascribes to Cassian some opinions on the fall and original sin which do not necessarily
follow from Cassian's written word.
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perhaps the magnitude of their attack against his venerated teacher. But in
chapter 2, he quickly gets very specific. Quite unambiguously he states that
he will limit himself to the statements of one author more competent than the
others in his knowledge of Sacred Scripture. Then, without ever mentioning
Cassian's name, he lets his readers know explicitly that he is referring to the
author of the Collationes XIII (De protectione De1). He tells us that he has
chosen this author over all the others for the definiteness of his statements.
Prosper begins by noting that during the first few chapters of the XIII
Conference Cassian teaches in a way that would deserve praise, did it not

later fall in error and slowly stray from its initial correctness. 40 For after a
discussion on why without God's help not only perfect chastity -- the main
topic of the conference -- but all good of every kind cannot be performed,
Cassian unambiguously writes:
"We can clearly infer from this that the initiative not only of our
actions but also of good thoughts comes from God, who inspires us
with a good will to begin with, and supplies us with the opportunity of
carrying out what we rightly desire. For every good gift comes down
from above, for the Father of lights (James 1, 17), who both begins
what is good and continues it and completes it in us. As the Apostle
says., 'But he who gives seed to the sower will both provide bread to
eat and will multiply your seed and make fruits of your righteousness to
increase.' (2 Car 9, 10).41
As a matter of fact, for the first six (short) chapters of the XIII
Conference Cassian uses several other examples and words to the same

effect.

But by chapter 7 we begin to notice a shift in emphasis.

Cassian

40. Contra Collatorem 2, 2, (Pl 51, 218 B): "...et justo honorari praeconio mereretur, nisi
praecipiti laevoque progressu, ab inchoata rectitudine deviaret."

41 . Collationes XIII, 3, 5. Translation from volume 11 of the series Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers.
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intends to show that the grace of Christ is universal and does not pass
anyone by. At one point he writes:
"And when God sees in us some beginnings of a good will, he at
once enlightens it and strengthens it and urges it on towards salvation,
increasing that which he himself implanted or which he sees to have
arisen from our own efforts."42
By now Cassian's idea seems clearly to be that good efforts may come
from the unaided human free will.

But Prosper gives it a "charitable"

interpretation since Cassian indeed could be speaking of the origin of the
good will. In other words, Cassian could be understood as saying that it is
from the hearts already enlightened by faith that these good efforts proceed.
But in chapter 9 Cassian clearly establishes a distinction which Prosper
throughout his book will highlight by placing it opposite to Cassian's initial
assertion. Cassian's distinction consists in the way that grace (in the sense of
divine calling) is dispensed by God. That is, it seemed obviously to Cassian
that some were called willingly while others unwillingly. Some seem to come
to grace of their own accord (like Zacchaeus and the good thief of the gospel)
while others like Paul and Matthew receive grace even while they are
apparently not amenable to it. Prosper rejects this distinction which is based
on the method of exegesis of Cassian who collects a number of texts from
Sacred Scripture which appear mutually contradictory. Cassian creates sort
of a stand off between the gifts of God's grace and the efforts of human
activity. So for example, he uses Romans 7, 18 "For I know that nothing good
dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do

11-" vis-a-vis Philippians 2, 13, "For God is at work in you. both to will and to
work for his good pleasure." Prosper counters by saying that St. Paul did not
42. Ibid. 8, 4.
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contradict himself for in one case (in Romans) he simply speaks as one
already called and given grace (thus of course, he can will what is right). By
this method of exegesis of text and counter text Cassian is not successful in
trying, on the one hand, to reject Pelagianism (which denied the absolute
gratuity of grace) and on the other hand to attribute sometimes the beginning
of faith to the unaided human free will. Moreover, he seems to think that this
dilemma is not soluble and only by keeping both alternatives open is error
avoided.

Cassian's distinction of Christ as saviour of some and refuge of

others accentuates this fundamental view.

Thus Prospers judgment that

Cassian is inconsistent seems well based to me.

One cannot hold to the

necessity and the nonnecessity of divine grace for the beginning of faith as
Cassian's statements seem to imply that he does.
At this point of the discussion Prosper introduces what appears to be a
foreign element into the argument.

But in reality Prosper just alludes

somewhat obliquely to a teaching from another of Cassian's conferences

(Collationes XVl~.43 Once again, the point that Prosper wants to make is
that Cassian's argument and method places in him -- whether he wants to or
not -- in the position of trying to keep two opposing alternatives in order to
avoid error. As a matter of fact Cassian writes:
"Does God have compassion upon us because we have shown
the beginning of a good will or does the beginning of a good will follow
43. Cassian taught in Collationes XVII, 20 that even the Apostles thought that a lie was
sometimes useful and the truth injurious. He gives the examples of James who urged Paul to
condescend to a fictitious arrangement for people who insisted on certain rites of purification
according to the law. He adds that Paul "became all things to all men so that he might save
all." In this context Cassian speaks of a useful and salutary hypocrisy ("utilis ac salubris
hypocrisis"). Not only this, but Cassian gives other examples where telling the truth was
actually the cause of deception as in the case of Samson who told Delilah the truth about the
source of his strength. Cassian's point is ambiguous at best and utilitarian at worst.
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because God has had compassion upon us? Many believing each of
these and asserting them more widely than is right are entangled in all
kinds of opposed errors. "44
For the next three chapters Prosper accumulates argument upon
argument from authority, by citing many of the pronouncements of the
Apostolic See and the councils against the Pelagians.

Of course, the

connection between Cassian and the Pelagians must be established for the
validity of such arguments and it must be admitted that these arguments do
not apply well against the person of Cassian.

By this time it seems that

Prosper can do little more than to refer continuously to Cassian's
inconsistency and try to place the last statements of the famous abbot at odds
with his first, uncontested one.
In chapter 7 Prospers turns to a more serene spiritual exegetical
argument.

Reflecting on John 6, 44 ("No one can come to me unless the

Father who sent me draws him") together with several other texts, he shows
how people are in fact drawn to God in a variety of ways, for example, by
contemplation of the beauty of creation, by hearing of past events, by fear, by
joy, by inner desire or by delight in God.45

But this variety does not

contradict that it is God who works all in all (1 Cor 12, 3) so not even in the
case of the good thief, where no indication that grace was at work in him was
apparent, are we correct in concluding that one section of humanity comes to
God by the sole prompting of their own will, while the other section is drawn in
spite of their reluctance and even compelled against their will (as Cassian

44. Collationes X/11, 11, 1.

45. For example, Rom 1, 20 (contemplation of the order and beauty of creation); Ps 78, 4
(mighty deeds of God in past events); Prov 1, 7 (fear of God, the beginning of wisdom); Ps
122, 1 uoy); Ps 84, 3 (longing or desire of God); Ps 119, 103 (delight in God).
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implies about St. Paul). Cassian had clearly argued that it is grace which is
operative in Paul and Matthew while it is free will that is operative in
Zacchaeus and the good thief. Prospers criticism is that in reality this view,
as stated, did away with free will in the former and with grace in the latter
case.
In the next chapters, Prosper discusses several of Cassian's
statements which appear to him to be much too optimistic about the
soundness of the human free will after the fall. In reality, Cassian's words
about human "goodness" after the fall are indeed ambiguous but Prospers
style of arguing probably magnifies them. However, this need not be taken as
deliberate on his part, since in general Prosper's view of grace (like
Augustine's) considers "good" only in the salvific sense.

To crown this

discussion, Prosper considers the following statement of Cassian: "We must
take care not to refer all the merits of the saints to the Lord in such a way as
to ascribe nothing but what is evil and perverse to human nature."46 This
statement could be understood in the sense that human free will positively
cooperates with grace, but Prosper interprets it in an altogether Pelagian
sense and ascribes to Cassian perhaps more than what would necessarily
follow from Cassian's written word. Once again, whether this is justified or not
is debatable. However, at the begining of chapter 12 Prosper himself seems
to sense this lack of necessity and apologetically writes: "But lest one think
that we act on suspicion and pry into the hidden intentions of the author
beyond what his words say, let us see whether his further text adds anything

46. Collationes XIII, 12, 5.
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new to what we know already."47

He then proceeds to give an insightful

spiritual exegesis of 1 Kings 8, 17ff related to a sophism found in Cassian's
text which could be summarized as follows: What shall we say of David's
intention to construct the temple? That it was good and came from God or
that it was evil and came from himself? If it was good and came from God,
why did he who inspired it not allow it to be carried out? If it was evil and
came from man (David), why did God praise it? Therefore it must be good
and come from man.
Prosper's answer is right on target. First of all, we need not conclude
that the inspiration was not from God for the sole reason that God wished
Solomon, the son of David, to build the temple instead.

We have many

examples in which God does not efficaciously will the good intentions which
are conceived by his inspiration.48

Furthermore, it was in fact under the

inspiration of God that the first temple was constructed not by David but by
the son of David in order to better prefigure the temple that was prepared in
Christ, son of God and son of David.49
In the next chapters (13 through 17) Prosper deals with the
consequences of another ambiguous statement made by Cassian in chapter
12 of the XIII Conference. Here Cassian speaks about the "seeds of virtue"
(virtutum semina) which, according to him, we may not doubt every soul

47. Contra Collatorem 12, 1 (PL 51, 243 D): "Sed ne suspicionibus agere videamur, et
latebras sensuum ultra verba rimari, quid aderescat cognitis, doceant quae sequuntur."

48. For example, the inspiration from Matt 28, 19-20 to preach the gospel through all the
world and the restriction of Acts 16, 6f. Or the many prayers (for the conversion of
unbelievers for instance) which are inspired by God.
49. This exegesis is similar to Augustine's in his Enarrationes in Psalmos 126, 2 and the De
civitate Dei 17, 8.
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possesses of its very nature, planted there by the Creator as a gift.50
Cassian adds that unless these "seeds" are stirred to life by God's help, they
will never grow and reach perfection.

Nevertheless, Prosper sees in

Cassian's statement a denial of the consequences of original sin by which
these "seeds of virtues" are not in us any longer. Prosper's point of view is
very much related to an often misunderstood Augustinian topic: the meaning
of "virtuous" human actions. For Augustine and obviously for Prosper, there
are certainly praiseworthy actions which indeed originated in nature, but they
cannot be called true "virtues" because their authors are far from God, the
creator of their nature. So for instance, there is no true "virtue" in the Stoics,
for their deeds are not oriented towards God, but oriented towards a value
given to the deeds themselves.

This is not to say that Prosper did not

recognize what we today would call naturally good acts.

In fact, Prosper

deals with this very issue in chapter 16 by an argument from Sacred
Scripture. On one hand, when St. Paul praises the faith of the Romans and
gives thanks to God for this virtue of theirs (Rom 1, 8) he did not mean to say
that the believers did not deserve praise for their faith. But on the other hand,
by praising the believers St. Paul did not mean to deny who is the author of
their merit. Prosper gives other examples from 1 Cor 1, 4, Eph 1, 15-18 and
Phil 1, 3-6.

In each case their faith and good works of charity are said to

deserve praise and merit. Yet for all these good actions St. Paul does not
cease to give thanks to God knowing that they are his gifts. Furthermore,
without the love of God as the ultimate reason for these actions they would
not be "good" in themselves.

50. Collationes XIII, 12, 7 (CSEL 13, 380): "Dubitari ergo non potest inesse quidem omni
animae naturaliter virtutum semina beneficio creatoris inserta."
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In conclusion, Prosper never denied the possibility of "naturally good"
actions. In fact, he explicitly talks about those people who receive God's call
through the natural law in contrast to those whom God calls by the preaching
of the gospel or by the Law in times before Christ (see his answers to the
Gauls, 8). What he argues against is the view which held as "virtuous" those
actions done in and for their own sake.51 Under these assumptions, Prosper
is disturbed by the statements of Cassian who asserts that the centurion (in
Mat 8, 8) would have deserved no praise nor gained any merit if Christ
singled him out only because of something which he himself had given him.52
Prosper is puzzled that Cassian does not see himself contradicted by his own
words.
Chapter 18 is a short summary of the entire discussion and in Chapter
19 we find twelve propositions which are taken from Cassian's text so as "to
enable the readers to recall more easily what during the reading may have
escaped their memory due to the interruptions of the answers given."53 This

51. Of these actions Augustine writes: "Nam licet a quibusdam tune verae et honestae
putentur esse virtutes, cum ad se ipsas referuntur, nee propter aliud expetuntur; etiam tune
inflatae ac superbae sunt; et ideo non virtutes, sed vitia judicanda sunt." De civ. Dei 19, 25
(PL 41, 656). This is the true meaning of the well known Augustinian phrase, "Nemo habet
de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum; si quid autem habet homo veritatis atque iustitiae, ab illo
fonte est, quern debemus sitire in hac eremo, ut ex eo quasi guttis quibusdam irrorati non
deficaciamus in via." 323rd of Prosper's Sententiae and 22 canon from the synod of Orange
529. The Augustinian meaning of this phrase has been so abused that the following
proposition of Baius (obviously similarly worded) was condemned by Pius V in his bull Ex
omnibus afflictionibus (Oct 1, 1567): "Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata. et philosophorum
virtutes sunt vitia."
52. Collationes X/11, 14, 4 (CSEL 13, 385): "Nullius enim laudis esset aut meriti, si id in eo
Christus quod ipse donaverat praetulisset."
53. Contra Collatorem 19, 1 (PL 51, 266 A): " ... ;ut quae interjectis responsionibus nostris,
possent recordationem legentis effugere, facilius simul decursa recolantur."
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summary is followed in chapter 20 by a further synthesis of Cassian's position
which by its very succinctness probably magnifies what strict logic would
necessarily demand from Cassian's texts.

So in many respects it is not

helpful.
Prosper concludes his work referring once again to the bitter Pelagian
dispute, their condemnation and the attempted resurgence which he ascribes
partly to the Massilians.

Perhaps realizing how ultimately inadequate

arguments are in the matter at hand, he states that the Massilian position
should be countered best by the weight of authority.54 Prosper finishes with
the following advice: To endure with patience, return love for hate, to avoid
disputes with the inept among them (the Massilians), to keep the truth and
wait until the Lord be pleased to settle the controversy "through the princes of
the Church and the lawful ministers of his justice."55
2.8 DE VOCATIONE OMNIUM GENTIUM

This work does not properly belong to the Massilian controversy.

It

was written around 450 and although the Prosperian authorship is not beyond
question, it is nowadays attributed to Prosper with some probability.56 By the
title of the work, one would be tempted to assume that it deals with the
question of whether and how all nations or peoples can achieve salvation.
However, the main theses of this bipartite work are the absolute

54. Ibid. 21, 4: "lgitur huiusrnodi horninurn pravitati, non tarn disputationurn studio quarn
auctoritaturn privilegio resistendurn est."
55. Ibid. 22: " ... ut donec Dorninus per Ecclesiae principes, et legitimos judiciorurn suorurn
rninistros, ... "
56. In a previous era Quesnel attributed this work to pope Leo I. In our own time G. de
Plinval (art. cit.) also opposes the Prosperian authorship.
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gratuituousness of divine grace and the universality of God's offer of grace.
The author clearly maintains that there is no salvation except by the grace of
God (cf. 1, 23; 2, 1) and furthermore, with characteristic Prosperian emphasis,
that the initium fidei is effected also by that divine grace. Besides the basic
theme of the absolute gratuituousness of divine grace discussed in the first
part, the defense of the thesis that God wills the salvation of all occupies most
of part two of the work.
Assuming the Prosperian authorship of the De vocatione, there is
another subject which requires careful attention if one is to really understand
Prosper's thought on the universality of grace. As we have seen, Prosper
placed a great deal of emphasis in the inscrutability of God's judgments. In
fact, Prosper's reverence towards the mysteries hidden in the divinum
propositum and his deep awareness that the details and reasons of this
propositum exceed our human grasp are the foundation for his thought on the

problems of the divine salvific will and the doctrine of predestination.

In

chapter 9 the De vocations states:
"Thus, with this faith firmly fixed in our hearts, it is most
profitable for us to believe that all good things, especially those that are
conducive to eternal life, are obtained, increased and preserved
through God's gift. Pious minds should not be disturbed over whether
all or not all men will be converted, if what is clear is not obscured by
what is hidden and if we do not exclude ourselves by what is open by
impertinently insisting on what is closed."57

57. De vocatione omnium gentium fiber 1 (PL 51, 657 C, D): "Fixa ergo hac fide in cordibus
nostris, immobiliterque fundata, qua saluberrime credimus omnia bona, ac maxime ea quae
ad vitam aeternam provebunt, Dei munere haberi, Dei munere augeri, Dei munere custodiri;
puto quod pius sensus non debeat in ea quaestione turbari, quae de omnium et de non
omnium hominum conversione generatur, si ea quae clara sunt, non de his quae occulta sunt
obscuremus, et dum procaciter insistimus clausis, excludamur ab apertis."
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And later on in chapter 21 it adds: "What God has willed to remain
hidden, should not be scrutinized; what he made manifest, should not be
disregarded,

lest we find

ourselves illicitly curious and ungratefully

damnable."58 These two passages are exemplary of Prosper's basic appeal
to differentiate between what is revealed and what is not and in no way do
they betray any tendencies or influences of fideism or agnosticism as P. De
Letter unfortunately has suggested.

As Paul Hacker so well put it, "The

gospel is not a collection of riddles for irreverent researchers to exercise their
conceited acumen, but its message involves an appeal to do something. And
the very first thing to do is the acknowledgment of the incomprehensible God
in the adoration of love."59
It is debated whether and to what extent Prosper modified Augustine's
ideas on the divine salvific will and the associated topic of predestination.
The different interpretations are based partly on the different conceptions of
Augustine's teachings, that is, what exactly is "Augustinianism". The general
consensus is that it is possible to discern a gradual decrease in the rigidity of
Prosper's "Augustinianism" under the theory of three different periods; a
period of no compromise (before Augustine's death), a period of partial
concessions (immediately after) and finally, a period of broad concessions
(the period during which the De vocatione omnium gentium was written). But
in the next chapter, by comparing and contrasting all of Prosper's own
writings, I will argue that in fact this alleged evolution cannot be deduced
simply from Prosper's writings.
58. Ibid. (PL 51, 674 C): "Ouae enim Deus occulta esse voluit, non sunt scrutanda; quae
autem manifesta fecit, non sunt negligenda: ne et in illis illicite curiosi, et in istis damnabiliter
inveniamur ingrati."
59. Paul Hacker, The theological foundations of evangelization (Steyler Verlag, 1980), p. 58.
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The only other works of possible Prosperian origin with any
connections with the Massilian controversy are, as I mentioned in chapter 1,
the Capitula and the collection Sententiarum ex operibus S. Augustini
delibatarum. Although of great historical significance, the latter work does not
affect any argument presented in this paper since it is simply a collection of
statements from Augustine's works.
because

it

consists

of

The Capitula or lndiculus is called so

1O articles,

which

are

considered

official

pronouncements of the Apostolic See on the issues of divine grace and free
will.

The Capitula prudently omits the difficult questions of predestination

(which to date are open for debate since the Magisterium of the Church has
not elaborated on these issues on predestination). Assuming the Prosperian
authorship of the Capitula,60 some have seen a move by Prosper away from
the Augustinian teachings simply because Augustine is not mentioned by
name in this work. But I will comment more on all this in the next chapter.

60. It is generally accepted that the Capitula is of Prosperian origins. However, we should
note that there are certain similarities with the works of pope Leo I (Patrologiae Latinae,
volume 54). See for instance, the comments of A. Hamman, op. cit., p. 557.
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CHAPTER Ill

THEOLOGY OF GRACE IN PROSPER OF AQUITAINE

3.1 PROSPER'S USE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE
Since so many of Prosper's arguments are from authority, a natural
question to ask is: upon what authority or authorities do his arguments rest?
For Prosper authority meant either the texts of Sacred Scripture, a reputable
teacher of the Church, or the "legitimate ministers of God's justice."1 But in
fact, his cited non-biblical authorities (besides the obvious mention of
Augustine and the pronouncements from the Apostolic See) are essentially
non-existent.

However, his references to Scripture are numerous by any

standard. In his use of the Bible, Prosper is quite careful about the context of
the texts, but sometimes to add rhetorical force to his argument he simply
interweaves the sacred text itself into his own prose. This is the most obvious
manner in which Prosper uses the Bible as an apologetical tool.

Prosper

articulates only one biblical exegetical rule (found in the letter to Rufinus).
This rule asserts that to defend a proposition or a principle, only texts which
cannot be understood in any other way but in favor of the given proposition or
principle should be used.

In other words, texts which can be quoted in

opposition to the principle for whose proof they are quoted are, in general,
invalidly used. To illustrate Prosper's method of biblical interpretation let us

1. Contra Collatorem (PL 51, 275 C): " ... legitimos judiciorum suorum ministros."
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look at the manner in which he treats the texts used by the Massilians and in
particular let us contrast Prosper with Cassian in their exegetical methods.
Both Cassian and Prosper use James 1, 17 ["Every good endowment
and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights."]
to show the necessity of divine grace. Similarly, they use 2 Cor 9, 1O ["He
who supplies seed to the sower and bread for food will supply and multiply
your resources and increase the harvest of your righteousness."]. But in his
attempt to discriminate between those who come to grace willing and those
who come unwillingly, Cassian relies on Rom 10, 20 ["I have been found by
those who did not seek me; I have shown myself to those who did not ask for
me."]. Prosper rejects this distinction and tries to show the awkward result of
Cassian's method which does not attend carefully to the context (e.g., Is 65, 1
which is the source of Rom 10, 20). Prosper states that the effect of grace in
the human soul is precisely to prepare the human will so no one unwillingly
could collaborate with divine grace. He also points out that no one who has
the use of reason could come to faith in any other way than voluntarily.
Cassian's own use of Sacred Scripture is characterized by an attempt
at what could be called an exegesis of equilibrium.2

He marshals his

evidence by collecting a large number of texts from Scripture which appear
mutually contradictory. So for example he uses Rom 9, 16 ["So it depends
not upon man's will or exertion, but upon God's mercy."] vis-a-vis Rom 2, 6
["For he will render to every man according to his works."). Or again Phil 2,
13 ["For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure."]
vis-a-vis Is 1, 19 ["If you are willing and obedient you shall eat the good of the
land."]. It is apparent that Cassian uses many of these texts without focusing
2. In his dissertation, T. Smith has described the exegetical method of Faustus of Riez as a
"hermeneutic of equilibrium" (p. 106).

62

on the context of the biblical passages. He is quick to conclude that these
texts show the existence of both the grace of God and the human free will.
But moreover, according to him, they show that sometimes we can conceive
the desire for virtue of our own accord while other times we are in need of
God's help.3 In order to see more clearly that at times the beginning of a
good will arises from the gifts of nature bestowed by the Creator -- a
beginning that however cannot reach the perfection of virtue without the
guidance of God's help -- Cassian proposes Rom 7, 18 ["For I know that
nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will what is right, but
I cannot do it."]. It becomes apparent that between Cassian's methodology of
equilibrium and Prosper's rule of non-opposition there is simply no feasible
resolution.
Prosper criticizes Cassian's use of Scripture not only for this
methodology but for what Prosper perceives as a selective use of the Bible.
So for example, in chapter 8 of the Contra Collatorem, Prosper cites a great
number of texts which are not considered at all by Cassian but which are
relevant to the issues at hand and somewhat unfavorable to Cassian's point
of view.4 In this battle of texts and counter texts, it is of canonical significance
to point out the following: A text from the book of Wisdom which Augustine
had used in his teachings on predestination is rejected by the Massilians as
not canonical.5 In turn, in his XIII Conference Cassian uses a text from the
3. The implicit idea seems to be that divine grace is somehow a rival to the human free will.
4. For instance, 1Cor12, 3; 4, 7; 15, 10; 7, 25; Eph 2, 8; Phil 1, 28; 2, 12; John 6, 66; 15, 5;
15, 16; 5, 21; Mt 16, 17.
5. In the De praedestinatione sanctorum, Augustine had quoted a work of St. Cyprian (De
mortalitate) in which the text from Wisdom 4, 11 had been quoted. But according to Prosper,
the Massilians rejected it: "Ubi et illud testimonium ponit de libro Sapientiae: Raptus est, ne
malitia mutaret intellectum eius. Quod a me quoque positum, fratres istos ita respuisse
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Shepherd of Hermas which Prosper promptly rejects as "nullius auctoritatis
testimonium."6
As a particularly remarkable example of how Cassian's method of
exegesis seems to ignore the context, Prosper points out Cassian's usage of
Gen 3, 22 ["Behold, Adam is become like one of us, knowing good and evil."].
Cassian believes that this text shows that after sinning, Adam did not lose
knowledge of the good and thus the "seeds of virtue" were still within him and
his descendants. Prosper indicts Cassian's hermeneutics by pointing out that
he speaks as if the promise of the devil had come true.

In other words,

Cassian's interpretation implies that by transgressing God's command Adam
and Eve had grown in likeness to God, just as the serpent had promised
them.7
Similarly, Prosper criticizes Cassian in his hermeneutics of a passage
from Job in the Old Testament. According to Job 1, 9, Satan complains to the
Lord Yahweh as follows:
"Does Job fear God for nought? Hast thou not put a hedge
about him and his house and all that he has, on every side? Thou hast
blessed the work of his hands, and his possessions have increased in
the land. But put forth thy hand now, and touch all that he has and he
will curse thee to thy face."
Cassian interprets the last sentence ("But put forth thy hand now, ... ")
as a challenge from Satan to God that Job be allowed to battle him with his
own strength, without God's help.

Cassian goes on to assert that since

dixistis, tamquam non de libro canonico adhibitum: quasi et excepta huius libri attestatione,
res ipsa non clara ist, quam voluimus hinc doceri." De praedestinatione sanctorum 14, 26.
6. Contra Collatorem (PL 51, 250 C).
7. "But the serpent said to the woman, 'You will not die. For God knows that when you eat of

it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.' " Gen 3, 4-5.
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Satan, so inclined to slander, does not dare to repeat this challenge after all of
Job's trials and tribulations, the devil confesses by his own silence that he
was defeated by the strength not of God but of Job himself.

Although

Cassian specifies that Job was not altogether left without divine help, "since
God allowed Satan no more power than he knew Job was strong to
withstand," Prosper asks if it would not be more correct to say that "God
allowed Satan no more power than he had given Job strength to withstand. "8
In summary, Prosper's exegetical method attends to the literal meaning
of the texts and searches for clarifications by using a wide variety of related
biblical passages. There is some measure of allegorical interpretation but in
general Prosper focuses carefully on the literal meaning. He places a good
deal of emphasis in the context of the text, much more so than Cassian who
tends to use proof texts.

For the most part Prosper comes across as an

accomplished exegete.9 He does not simply graft biblical passages to his
argument as decorations, although it would be very difficult to ascertain to
what extent his doctrinal argument emerges from his exegesis.

3.2 ON PREDESTINATION AND THE DIVINE SALVIFIC WILL
Augustine's prolonged defense of the absolute gratuitous nature of
divine grace forced him to delve deeper and deeper into the mystery of
predestination.10 Quite naturally, the logic of his system and the questions
8. Contra Collatorem 15, 4 (PL 51, 258 B): "... , Quantam et illium resistendi noverat habere
virtutem; diceres potius, quantam et illi resistendi noverat se dedisse virtutem?" See also the
Collationes XIII, 14, 2 for Cassian's own words.
9. One of Prosper's works (not relevant to this paper) is his exegetical Expositio psalmorum,
a commentary on psalms 100 through 150.
10. By "predestination" we mean "the prescience and the preparation of God's gifts whereby
those liberated are most certainly liberated" ("praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei,
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that sprang forth from it often forced the great bishop of Hippo to take the
risks of theological speculation. As a result of certain formulas deriving from
these speculations, some of Augustine's expressions on the divine salvific will
and predestination have been the subject of passionate debates, not only in
the early fifth century, but throughout subsequent history. Some have seen in
Augustine's teachings a system which asserts that not only has God elected
some individuals from all eternity, but at the same time God has reprobated
the remaining part of humanity to eternal damnation. Accordingly, this system
also asserts that both classes of people are in absolute powerlessness to
escape this irresistible situation which leads them accordingly either to good
or evil actions.11
Prosper's debate with the Massilians, first and foremost, also revolved
around the absolute gratuity of divine grace.

Naturally there were other

interrelated theological issues at stake. Indeed, some of these issues have
not been clearly resolved even today. But in discussing Prospers exposition
of predestination and the divine salvific will, the first thing we must avoid is to
frame the issues anachronistically.

We must always consider that from

Prosper's point of view the fundamental issue at stake was the very idea of

quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur." De dono perseverantiae 14, 35). I have
noted that in this definition the word "praescientia" (prescience or more commonly translated
as ''foreknowledge") does not refer to God's "foreknowledge" of the merits of the elect. It
simply means that in his prescience God has prepared the gifts which he intends for the elect
so that in fact they are saved. This is the basis of Augustine's notion of a decisive and
definite divine will which knows with certitude the number of the elect.
11. H. Rondet writes: "Thus, whenever future ages restudy Augustine's own thought, there
will come along some intrasigent mind eager for systematization and ready to draw from his
writings a mercilessly predestinarian synthesis. ... But there will also be solidly orthodox
reactions on the part of faithful Augustinians who will try to correct Augustine with Augustine."
The Grace of Christ, translated by Tad Guzie (Newman Press, 1966), p. 142.
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grace as an unmerited gift of God. Prosper saw that the vindication which
Augustine had won for this teaching against the Pelagians was threatened
once again by the Massilians' tenets. Without this perspective, for instance,
one easily misunderstands Prosper's insistence that Pelagianism was a
"parent" of the Massilians tenets, which however far removed from those of
the Pelagians, were at odds with the Catholic idea of grace as a pure gift.
With this clearly established we may ask:
grace?

What is Prosper's theology of

Or in other words, what is Prosper's contribution to the Church's

understanding of grace, especially on the issues of the divine salvific will and
predestination?
As we have seen, the Massilians interpreted the Pauline text that "God
wills all to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim, 2, 4) in a
way which gave the human free will the essential decision whether one is
saved or not. Augustine on the other hand -- arguing from the assumption
that all are not saved and from a notion of an absolute and victorious divine
will -- spoke often about what some have termed a "restricted" divine salvific
will. But this is misleading because Augustine does not contradict 1 Tim 2, 4.
He simply refers to the infallibly efficacious divine will that leads the elect to
salvation. But God does not command what is impossible, so he must will in
some way to make it really possible for all to comply with his commandments.
Otherwise no one could avoid committing actual sin which in this case would
no longer be sin or any divine punishment for such action would be a manifest
injustice.
Augustine established all of the above, and without any restrictions he
indeed stated that Christ died for all. But Prosper emphasized not only the
reality of and the absolute gratuity in God's eternal choice of the elect but also
the reality that this divine choice did not destroy either a true divine will to
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save all nor did it suppress in any way the human free will. Naturally, the
main objection which the Massilians presented was how to reconcile the
assertions of this last statement.

The Massilians did not believe these

assertions could be reconciled.12

They argued that the human free will

decides one's own election or reprobation by consent or resistance to divine
grace.

In contrast to this opinion, Prosper maintained implicitly that only

reprobation could be said to be the direct decision of the human free will.
Moreover, the Massilians took a more rationalistic approach to the question
while an important aspect of the problem in Prosper's view was our basic
inability to scrutinize the reasons behind the divine choice.
The teaching of Prosper with respect to the divine salvific will is
expressed best when he writes:
"It must be most sincerely believed and professed that God wills
all to be saved. For the Apostle (1 Tim 2, 4) whose sentence this is,
most insistently commands what is a most pious custom in all the
churches, that prayers be offered to God for all; that many of these
perish is the fault of those who perish; that many are saved is the gift of
him who saves."13
In these words, Prosper formulates all the aspects of the mystery.
Note that on the one hand Prosper maintains God's will to save all. On the
other hand he insists on election as an absolute gift from God and reprobation
as ultimately the fault of those reprobated.
Prosper's exposition on the divine salvific is based on the literal
meaning of 1 Tim 2, 4.
exegetical argument.

Unlike Augustine, he does not rely on any forced

Augustine had interpreted this text saying that God

12. For the Massilians, there was no predestination except in the sense that God ordains a
reward or a punishment as the consequence of a given (foreseen) human action.
13. Ad Cap. obiect. Vine. 2 (PL 51, 179 Band C).
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does not will the salvation of each individual but only of some. However, as I
have noted previously, Augustine spoke in this case only incidentally, not with
a direct intention. At any rate, Augustine's formulations were given often in
the context of that absolute and victorious will (voluntas absoluta et victrix)
with which God absolutely wills the salvation of those actually saved. Of this
will Augustine says, "The will of the Almighty is always invincible."14 Clear
evidence that Prosper believed Augustine to hold to a true divine salvific will
can be found in Prosper's response to the second Vincentian article in which
Prosper protests against attributing to Augustine the supposition that God did
not sincerely wish the salvation of all.
Significantly, Prosper also relies on an argument from the praxis of the
Church

who

urges

"that

supplications,

prayers,

intercessions,

and

thanksgiving be made for all men." (1 Tim 2, 1) because "this is good and
acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour." (1 Tim 2, 3). This is one of the
best examples of Prosper's application of the maxim "legem credendi lex
statuat supplicandi."15 In other words, for Prosper it was in the praxis of the
Church to pray for all that one would find the ultimate demonstration that God
wills all to be saved.
14. Enchiridion 102: "Omnipotentis voluntas semper invicta est."
St. John Damascene wrote: "God wills all to be saved initially. To make us partakers
of his goodness, as good; but after we have sinned, he wills to punish us as just." ("Deus
praecedentur vult omnes salvari. Efficit nos bonitatis suae participes, ut bonus; peccantes
autem punire vult, ut justus." De Fide orthodoxa 2, 29). On the other hand, St. Augustine
seems in a few passages to think differently. In the Summa Theologica I, 19, 6, in an attempt
to reconcile the two, St. Thomas Aquinas makes the well known distinction between the
antecedent will of God and the consequent will of God. Historically, this distinction evoked
even further explanations on the mystery of divine election. Eventually, everything came to a
head at the Congregatio de Auxiliis (1598-1607). But the result was a stalemate, all sides
being forbidden by Church authority to libel the other.
15. Capitulum 8 (PL 51, 209 D).
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It is interesting to note that Augustine's more rigid formulations often
came from his exegetical arguments.16 It is perhaps due to the absence of
many of the Augustinian exegetical arguments that when Prosper speaks
about reprobation his focus is less on the massa damnata outlook (emphasis
on original sin) and more on demerits (emphasis on personal sin). This is not
to deny Prosper's keen sense of original sin, which after all was at the root of
his acceptance of God's judgment on unbaptized children. With regards to
this last point, we should keep in mind that all parties involved in this
controversy never formulated clearly any objection to the universal salvific will
of God drawn from the case of children who die unbaptized. That is, they
never formulated the following question: If God's will to save includes all, will
unbaptized children perish without any fault of their own? Both the Massilians
and Prosper only assumed the necessity of baptism. So in the debate itself
this question was never an issue.17 However, the case of children who are
baptized and die (and thus are saved) was used indeed by Prosper as the
best evidence showing that human merits were not the deciding factor in
election.
16. For instance, his exegesis of 1 Tim 2, 4. Also his exegesis of Romans (in particular Rom
9, 13 ["Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated."] led him to his formulations of the massa damnata
theory. But Augustine himseH was clearly aware of the dangers of "cold" logic when he
wrote: "Da mentem et sintit quod dico. Si autem frigido loquor, nescit quid loquor." Tractatus
in loannis Evangelium 26, 4 (PL 35, 1608).
17. It is noteworthy what Augustine writes when questioned directly about the fate of
unbaptized infants; "Cum ad poenas ventum est parvulorum, magnis, mihi crede, coarctor
angustiis, ne quid respondeam prorsus invenio." Epistola 166, Ad Hieronymum 6, 16.
Again we can speculate that Augustine's apparent rigidity in the case of unbaptized
infants is due (to a great extent) to his exegetical argument from John 3, 3 coupled with his
opposition to the Pelagian exegesis of John 14, 2 ["in my Father's house there are many
rooms."]. While the Pelagians thought this text referred to different "places" in the kingdom of
heaven, Augustine maintained that "multae mansiones diversas meritorum in una vita
aeterna significant dignitates." Tractatus in loannis Evange/ium (PL 35, 1812).
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To summarize: Prosper clearly rejected the idea that divine election is
the result of God's prescience of human merit. The idea of the absolute
gratuity of divine grace was the reason behind this ["What have you that you
did not received? 1 Cor 4, 7]. However, Prosper equally rejected the idea that
God reprobates without regards to demerits.

Otherwise, one is forced to

abandon immediately the idea that "God wills all to be saved." In this regard,
the author of the De vocatione had one original contribution in providing a
meaning to the universal salvific will as expressed in 1 Tim 2, 4. Namely, God
wills all to be saved means that God gives grace to all, though not in the same
degree. Furthermore, everyone receives a gratis genera/is but only some a
gratis specialis. Only the latter actually attain salvation. The question as to

why only some receive this special grace remained unanswered. However, it
is stated that "grace prevails in some while nature recoils in others."18 This
insight -- that a general grace is offered to all and that a special grace is
offered to the elect, those who God knows will not "recoiled from" that gratis
genera/is) -- seems to be a precursor of the distinction between sufficient and

efficacious grace which theologians used and developed in later centuries.
Now let us address the issue of Prosper's place in history as an
expositor of "Augustinianism" and his role in the eventual Church sanction in
favor of some of Augustine's teachings. In particular we may ask, how faithful
was Prosper to Augustine's thought and what was the dependence of
Prosper's presentation of the issues of predestination and the divine salvific
will on Augustine's own exposition? As far as predestination is concerned, I
maintain that Prosper was a most faithful follower of Augustine, first and
foremost in his refusal to identify predestination with divine foreknowledge of
18. De vocatione omnium gentium fiber II, 25 (PL 51, 711 B): "sed in aliis praevaluisse
gratiarn, in aliis resiluisse naturarn."
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human merits.

Nowhere in his writings do we find any ambiguity on this.

However, some have perceived Prosper moving away from Augustine in other
ways.

P. de Letter tries to differentiate between a possible Prosperian

evolution away from Augustine's expressions and Augustine's ideas on
predestination.

He sees in the De vocatione omnium gentium an "evident

desire and an effective attempt to tone down Augustine's rigid expressions
and views on predestination."19 He notes the "conspicuous absence" of all
predestinatorial terminology.

The terms in question are "praesciti" and

"praeordinati" which are used instead of "praedestinati" in all cases except
when quoting Scripture (for example, Eph 1, 3-6).
In trying to weigh the significance of this fact, I suggest there are other
factors to consider. First of all, one must admit that the Prosperian authorship
of this work is not beyond question. Even assuming that Prosper is the author
of the De vocatione, one must deal with the fact that the raison d'etre of this
work is unknown, unlike Prosper's other works which were written in response
to well known circumstances. But more to the point, Augustine himself was
not enslaved by any terminology. For instance, Augustine often used "electi"
even in the De predestinatione sanctorum.

If we consider the negative

connotations that the term "predestination" had developed by the middle of
the fifth century20, it should not be too surprising that an author would try to
avoid using certain terminology, but not necessarily in order to dissociate

19. P. de Letter, ACW 14, p. 18.
20. For instance, the necessity to convoked a synod (Aries 473) to deal with "predestinarian"
teachings.
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himself from previously held views. Moreover, even de Letter admits that the
Augustinian idea of predestination appears explicitly in the De vocatione.21
In evaluating the reasons for different terminologies one should recall
also that in previous works (the Contra Collatorem for example) much of the
so called "predestinarian" terminology was not used by Prosper either.
Therefore, I maintain that it is more likely that Prosper is trying to keep his
distance from predestinarian distortions of Augustine than from Augustine
himself. The key observation is that the author of the De vocatione maintains
a theory of election explicitly in line with the aforementioned definition of
Augustinian predestination (see footnote 1O in this chapter).
In reality, the general statement that Prospers theology of grace is or
is not "Augustinian" is not helpful if one does not define what is meant by
"Augustinian". This task could be the subject matter for several dissertations
as well as a lifetime of studying the writings of St. Augustine. Therefore, my
approach has been not to try to define "Augustinian" per se but to compare,
first of all, Prosper with himself. This can be done only by examining all his
writings, including the De vocatione allegedly written by Prosper some 25
years after his first works, the letters to Rufinus and Augustine. Of course, on
very specific points I do compare and contrast Prosper with Augustine.
The theory that Prosper underwent an evolution, passing from an
unconditional "Augustinian" to a more moderate stance is based to a great
extent on a comparison of the De vocatione with Prospers other works. The
fact that there are some two decades separating these works should be
reason enough to expect a natural development, especially on issues that
were themselves in embryonic stages. But how marked is this development?

21. For instance, P. de Letter, ACW 14, p. 216 (footnote 301) and p. 217 (footnote 312).
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In which issues is this alleged development seen?

One of the principal

expositors of this theory is D. M. Cappuyns who distinguishes between a first
period of intrasigeance, followed by /es premieres concessions and finally
some grandes concessions in Prosper's writings.22 But a reexamination of
Prosper's early works, and a comparison between them and the De
vocatione, indicates to me that the differences, in expressions and especially

in ideas, are not such that this theory can be maintained without major
alterations.
Cappuyns himself, in an earlier article 23, tried to show the Prosperian
authorship of the De vocatione on the basis of the following observations: A)
the manuscript tradition which in a nearly unanimous fashion points to
Prosper as the author, and B) his comparison of the De vocatione with other
known Prosperian works which yielded, 1) a similarity of expressions and
similar ways of developing ideas, 2) a similarity in the biblical references
used, and 3) an identical teaching on practically all points of doctrine. Notice
in particular the last observation made by Cappuyns. That is, after a close
examination of the doctrinal parallelism between Prosper and the author of
the De vocatione, Cappuyns himself concludes that there are no real
differences in doctrine (p. 212). But he cannot have it both ways. On the one
hand, in this first article, in order to prove that Prosper is the author of the De
vocatione he argues that there are no real differences in doctrine. On the

other hand, in his second article, he argues in favor of a theory of doctrinal
change (not merely development) in Prosper's exposition, from period of

22. D. M. Cappuyns, "L'Augustinisme de Prosper D'Aquitaine." Recherches de Theologie
Ancienne et Medievale 1 (1929): 309-37.

23. "L' auteur du De vocatione omnium gentium." Revue Benedictine 39 (1927): 198- 226.
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intrasigence to a period of great concessions. I understand this to mean that
Cappuyns had found real differences by the time of his second article. But
then, this would reduce considerably the strength of his argument in favor of
the Prosperian authorship of the De vocatione.
Cappuyns wrote yet another article in which he points to the absence
of Augustine's name from the Capitula as further evidence of Prosper's move
to dissociate himself from "Augustinianism". But arguments from silence are
notoriously hard to handle and this one in particular shows considerable
weakness in the evidence.24 But let us continue with our reexamination.
The main ideas of the De vocatione are explicitly: 1) the insistence on
the absolute gratuity of divine grace and the error of those who hold that in
preaching this "grace" one denies human free will, 2) that God wills all to be
saved and that this salvation is due to divine grace, 3) that God's judgments
are inscrutable. As far as 1) and 3) are concerned, the evidence I derive by
direct comparison of all 7 of Prosper's works prior to 435 fails to reveal any
real development, let alone a marked changed in expressions or in any of the
fundamental ideas.25

On predestination itself, everyone agrees that the

24.
D. M. Cappuyns, "L'origine des Capitula pseudo-celestiniens contre le
semipelagianisme." Revue Benedictine 41 (1929): 156-70.
Recall that the Capitula is the document traditionally attached to letter 21 of pope
Celestine I to the Gallic bishops. This letter does mention (in fact praises) Augustine.
Accordingly, even assuming Prosperian authorship, I fail to see the need for the Capitula to
mention Augustine explicitly or to deduce that by failing to do so its author is abandoning any
of Augustine's teachings on grace. This seems more a matter of prudence than anything
else, especially when we are dealing with an authoritative document attempting to settle
doctrinal issues between conflicting parties, where the names are not relevant and in fact
could hinder the resolution of the issues.
25. I am assuming the following chronology of Prosper's relevant works in the controversy:
1) the letter to Rufinus, 2) the letter to Augustine, 3) the poem Carmen de ingratis, 4) the
answer to the Genoese, 5) Prosper's response to the Gauls and 6) to the so called
Vincentian articles, 7) the Contra Collatorem. In fact these are all his known works prior to
435. After this date we have two other relevant works of alleged Prosperian origins, the
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Augustinian definition appears explicit even in the De vocatione. The fact that
Prosper emphasizes that the reprobates owe their reprobation to their sins
need not be seen as a "softening" in the Augustinian teaching of
predestination. As a matter of fact, a nuanced discussion of the Augustinian
teaching on predestination should distinguish carefully between expressions
referring to the elect and expressions referring to the reprobate.26
Augustine's teaching is simply augmented when Prosper speaks about
reprobation (not when he speaks about election).
Inasmuch as all humanity has sinned in Adam,27 Augustine spoke of a
massa damnata but never meaning an arbitrary divine decree which assigns

certain people to be eternal reprobates. Prosper alludes to this in his letter to
Rufinus but he focuses more on reprobation as a result of personal sins

Capitula and De vocatione. There are several other works which are not directly associated
with the controversy and so they are not taken into consideration in the present discussion.

26. Cf. Our previous quotation from Augustine's debate with Felix the Manichean, as well as
his De correptione et gratia 13, 42 (written c. 426) where Augustine speaks of the reprobates
as those who desert God and in turn are deserted. William Most has pointed out that in
Augustine, aside from his massa damnata outlook of humanity, we can find a teaching of
predestination without merits which emphasizes reprobation depending on demerits (Novum
tentamen ad solutionem de Gratia et Praedestinatione, Editiones Paulinae, 1963, pp. 208ff.
The following passages from Augustine's works are also relevant to this point: De diversis
quaest. 83, 68, 5 (written between 388 and 395); De catechizandis rudibus 52 (written 399);
De peccat. mer. et rem. 2, 17, 26 (first work of the Pelagian controversy written c. 412);
Tractus in loan. Evang. 53, 6 (written between 413 and 418); Most's observation that this
view is present in Augustine's writings basically from the beginning of his career to his death,
without retraction or amendment is illustrated by the dates of composition of the various
works.
27. Christ and his mother excepted. Augustine himseH states: "Excepta itaque sancta
virgine Maria, de qua propter honorem Domini nullam prorsus cum de peccatis agitur, haberi
volo quaestionem: unde enim scimus quod ei plus gratiae collatum fuerit ad vincendum omni
ex parte peccatum, quae concipere ac parece meruit, quern constat nullum habuisse
peccatum."
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known by God in his prescience rather than on original sin. This focus left
Prosper with the difficult case of unbaptized infants, a case which he did not
considered fully and which even today remains a difficult case to explain
using any theory that does not fall into a universalism which has never been
acceptable to the mind of the Church. Even in the case of adults, Prosper's
focus leaves the theology of grace appearing less "rigid" but perhaps more
shrouded in mystery for the question of why God permits certain individuals to
sin without efficaciously intending that their sins be forgiven and the universal
salvific will expressed in 1 Tim 2, 4 are hard to reconcile.28 In fact, the De
vocatione begins by defining this problem when it states:

Among the defenders of free will and the preachers of the grace
of God, a great and difficult question has been debated for a long time.
The point at issue is whether God wills all to be saved; and since this
cannot be denied, why is the will of the Almighty not realized? When
the latter is said to happen because of the human will, grace seems to
be excluded; and if grace is given as a reward for merits, it is not a gift
but something owed. But then, why is this gift, without which no one is
saved, not given to all by him who wants all saved? Thus, there is no
end to the disputations as long as it is not discerned between what is
manifested and what remains hidden."29
Notice that for Prosper it is a given that God wills all to be saved. For
Augustine, in view of his insistence that the reprobate could be justly
condemned even by original sin, this divine will to save all was not an
28. I say even more shrouded in mystery since the massa damnata view based on original
sin at least explains the "justice" behind an otherwise unknown reason for non-election.
29. De vocatione omnium gentium fiber 1 (PL 51, 648-9 A): "Inter defensores liberi arbitrii,
et praedicatores gratiae Dei, magna et difficilis dudum vertitur quaestio. Quaeritur enim
utrum velit Deus omnes homines salvos fieri; et quia negari hoc non potest, cur voluntas
Omnipotentis non impleatur inquiritur? Cumque hoc secundum voluntatem hominum fieri
dicitur, gratia videtur excludi; quae si meritis redditur, constat earn non donum esse, sed
debitum. Unde iterum quaeritur cur hoc donum, sine quo nemo salvus est, ab eo qui omnes
salvari vult, non omnibus conferatur. Atque ita, contrariarum disputationum nullus terminus
reperitur, dum non discernitur quid manifestum, quid sit occultum."
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emphasis.

But a more nuanced approach would distinguish among

Augustine's different uses of the word will.

Whatever lack we find in

Augustine the exegete -- in his attempts to explain the text of 1 Tim 2, 4 by
saying that "all" meant "many" or the actual "elect" or "from every class or
race of men" -- there is no doubt that Augustine the theologian, leaving intact
the absolute gratuity of divine grace, always admitted a universal salvific will.
If one were to find evidence in Augustine's works that the reprobates were
positively rejected independently of human action (as he asserts the elect are
chosen), then we would have to admit that Augustine indeed held to a
"restrictive" salvific will. But this is not the case.30 The most that could be
said is that for Augustine the divine salvific will is not absolute in the sense
that there are reprobates.
Without underestimating the "harshness" of this position, it is clear that
Prosper understands the divine salvific will very much in the same manner
(see his formulation of the problem in the above quotation). And so even at
this level, Prosper remains quite in line with Augustine's thought. In the final
analysis, as Henri Rondet has pointed out, it is inaccurate to speak of
Augustine's harshness or pessimism because Augustine, like St. Paul, after
speaking of falling humanity immediately highlights his statements by an
insistence on God's power and mercy.

No doubt, the most "rigid" text of

Augustine is the dreadful picture of humanity which he paints as a
consequence of the sin of our first parents. In this text from his Enchiridion
(27), the massa damnata terminology appears embarassing to modern eyes.
If God had let all of humanity perished, Augustine says, no one could have
said he was unjust.

After all, it happened with the fallen angels.

But

30. Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo; life and controversies, Canterbury Press Norwich
(1988)ch.9,p.388.
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immediately Augustine adds that God is merciful and his mercy is shown in
those whom he saves through grace.
In conclusion, I believe that Prosper's exposition is quite faithful to
Augustine's thought. It could be said that Prosper "corrected Augustine with
Augustine" in explaining reprobation with an emphasis on personal demerits.
Using a more balanced method, Prosper maintained the universal salvific will
in God together with a notion of divine predilection. If Prosper is indeed the
author of the De vocatione he provided an original idea on the meaning of the
divine salvific will by distinguishing between a "general" grace and an
"special" grace. This distinction, by the very nature of the issues, admittedly
still left some points obscured (and they remain so even today). But here
Prosper contributes yet something else of equal importance; his constant
reminder to posterity of the value of that advice which Augustine so well
expressed: "Let us allow God to be capable of something which we must
admit we are not capable of scrutinizing."31

31. Epistola 137, 2, 8: "Demus Deum aliquid posse, quod nos fateamur investigare non
posse."
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